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The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military


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Research Study

The Political Role of the Yugoslav Military

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH

March 1975

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE
YUGOSLAV MILITARY

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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

It is the general thesis of this study that the political role of the Yugoslav military has evolved since 1971 in the general framework of strengthening central authority to the point where military support is essential to the preservation and extension of that authority. The political influence which has accrued to the military institution in this process is likely to continue, and in the post-Tito era, assuming the military's continued respect for civilian institutions and processes, its role within them is likely to be more pronounced.

The 1971 Croatian crisis marked the beginning of the political ascendance of the military, and an emergent pattern of reliance by the civilian leadership on the military institution as a guarantee of the country's political system and stability. In its most general aspects, the crisis itself was the product of a fundamental dispute underway since 1965 over the proper admixture of republican and federal authority. Throughout the late 1960's the balance was skewed in favor of the country's six republics and two autonomous provinces, and the prevalent belief became that increased Yugoslav cohesion should be achieved through a greater measure of republican autonomy and ethnic self-affirmation. This proved to be not a formula for unity, but a political metastasis, spread by the increasing impotence of federal authority, and by growing expressions of republican self-interest. By 1971 the excessive concentration of authority in the republics and provinces had caused the federal structure to disintegrate into what one Yugoslav critic called "national bureaucratic monoliths."

By mid-1971 the political and economic demands of Croatia for more independent powers had been cast in terms of a volatile anti-Serb nationalism which, unchecked, threatened national calamity, even civil strife. Tito and the federal Party thereupon successfully ousted the dissident portion of the Croatian Party leadership, and set out to restore federal authority in Party and government. Nevertheless, while the essence of this political consolidation can fairly be termed re-centralization, Yugoslavia remains very much a federal state. Federal power is still bound to respect particular republican interests. The latter are counterposed against federal policies designed to further

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national equality, and remain the subject of federal-republican negotiation and bargaining. Similarly, because of the continuing reality of contending republican interests, the authority of the federal Party is not something that could be established by simple fiat or through new formal political relationships created to emphasize federal authority.

The increased level of political participation by the military evident since the Croatian crisis reflects its rise in importance in a setting of political uncertainty, accentuated by the prospect of the 82-year-old Tito's departure, and the possibility of future political violence. The changing role of the military has been a consequence of the weaknesses of central political authority, as well as of Party efforts to insure military loyalty and a unified leadership. And these changes have been carried further by Tito's conviction that the Army, because of its loyalties and institutional strengths, has a vital role to play in insuring continuity and stability.

The Army's new importance has had a profound effect on its institutional status.

- Policies of the pre-December 1971 period which threatened the professional and institutional integrity of the Army and the dilution of its authority in the country's defense have been reversed, most notably the organization of the system of Territorial Defense.
- A number of important Party and state positions are now occupied by military leaders. The Minister of the Interior and Public Prosecutor are Army generals, and the Army holds a position on the eight-man LCY Executive Committee, the highest Party body, as well as two seats on the 48 member LCY Party Presidium. The number of military delegates in the Central Committee is the largest ever, with occupants of key military command and staff positions now apparently allotted Central Committee posts. Recent changes, in addition, give the military, together with the State Presidency—the highest government body—more direct control over the procedure for activating military forces for internal and external purposes.
- Meanwhile, veterans' organizations have surfaced as apparent surrogates of elements of the military leadership in urging more radical measures against political dissidence than the consensus of the Party leadership has been willing to adopt.

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— Finally, a revitalized security system has been consolidated under effective military auspices in order to insure that its various agencies remain wholly responsive to federal needs and immune to political pressures to which they succumbed in 1971 and 1972. A key role in this centralized system has been assigned to military counter-intelligence.

The excessive political influence which accrued to Tito's personal advisor for security questions—an Army general—during the post-Croatian period of political realignment and uncertainty illustrated the contradictions of simultaneously relying heavily upon and controlling the military. The Party leadership's concern to insure its control over the military is evident in the revitalized role and enhanced authority given the Army Party organization. Its expanded powers of oversight combined with a new stress on political-ideological training are designed to eliminate or intercept any untoward activity which could endanger YPA cohesion. Similarly, a long-term effort to eliminate the image and the fact of a Serb-dominated military by creating a genuine national/ethnic balance in the YPA continues. Some progress has been made. The highest command and staff echelon, the reserve officer corps and Territorial Defense forces, and representation in officers' schools all reflect the ethnic distribution of the population. Altering the composition of the general and middle-level officer corps has proven more difficult; recruitment efforts have foundered on the more attractive employment possibilities open to individuals in the more economically advanced republics of Croatia and Slovenia. Also with an eye to fostering YPA cohesion and morale, a number of remedial measures are aimed at ameliorating professional inequities by raising the social status and emoluments of officers.

The apocalyptic scenario of a military coup is only one of a number of possible alternatives for military intervention in the political direction of the state. Barring a national calamity or a vacuum of political leadership, the exercise of political influence by the military is not likely to take such dramatic form. The Army is not a convincing alternative to the Party in preserving and extending domestic integration, although it may serve as an instrument of those policies. It is the Party's overarching political and ideological claims which have made it the legitimate embodiment of an integral Yugoslavia. Overt military rule, the usurping of civilian authority, is something the military must eschew, insofar as they are eager to preserve the continuity of the state, its political institutions and ideological prin-

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ciples, from which derive the country's stability, and the legitimacy of its integrationist policies. The military's recognition of this has and will continue to serve as a strong restraint on any inclination to adopt an interventionist role—short of a situation of extreme instability.

Unquestionably, however, a strong sense of custodianship inheres in the YPA which could provide both a political license and an impulse toward autonomous political behavior, especially in situations of stress or crisis. While military loyalty to the principle of subordination is clear, it is nevertheless conditional, not only upon the Party leadership's cohesion, but at a minimum its ability to preserve the integral Yugoslav state, and its adherence to the political course elaborated since 1971. Should that leadership or its resolve appear seriously weakened, the Army would probably assume a more direct role as political arbiter or factional ally. In the event of intense high-level political rivalry and disagreement, and without Tito's authority as the determining point of reference, the Army—given its strong position within the system—is therefore likely to become more of an autonomous political actor. This need not be inconsistent with civilian political supremacy, but that it will alter the shape of institutional or leadership politics in Yugoslavia is certain.

In the post-Tito setting relatively conservative military attitudes might over time have a more direct and telling effect on policy. The military would probably remain committed to the fundamentals of Tito's "self-management" system, including the relative autonomy of industrial enterprises and a genuinely federal government. Nevertheless, it is a safe assumption that the military would use its influence to press for and insure the continuation of recent stricter political/organizational policies, perhaps in somewhat exaggerated form. The military would thus tend to favor a greater reliance on administrative and centralist methods of control, and vastly strengthened discretionary authority for Party bodies. It would be given to a quicker reaction time in anticipating or dealing with political, social or economic deviation, erring on the side of caution rather than tolerance.

Yet, what is often assumed to be a monolithic unity in the officer corps remains untested. Furthermore, the dissident behavior of some general officers and certain veterans' activities are evidence that a conflict of loyalties (above all over the Serb-Croat national issue) could surface in a variety of future scenarios to compromise YPA cohesion. Such discord might be felt especially if the application of force was deemed necessary in a domestic crisis.

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As for the military's foreign political attitudes, there seems little reason to doubt the Army's ability to act with decision and unity should Yugoslavia face an attack or heavy diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union. But there is evidence, albeit inconclusive, that some elements within the general officer corps might favor a more acquiescent posture toward the USSR. The same evidence also suggests, however, that if pro-Soviet officers exist they are a fringe phenomenon.

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YUGOSLAVIA




Figure 1. Yugoslavia

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THE DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Disintegration and Reform

In 1971 Yugoslavia faced its gravest political crisis since Tito's 1948 confrontation with Stalin. Long-dormant ethnocentric attitudes surfaced in Croatia with astonishing virulence, and raised anew the question of the viability of an integral, multinational Yugoslav state. The most immediate political issue was the Croatian demand to retain a greater portion of its foreign exchange earnings which, according to existing practice, were siphoned off for investment in less developed republics as determined by federal authorities in Belgrade. More fundamentally, in this and other matters, the issue was the appropriate degree of autonomy which Croatia—and, by implication, the other five republics—should be granted within the Yugoslav federation. The resistance which Croatian demands encountered in Belgrade originated in the obligation of federal officials for the welfare and development of the entire country, and to a degree in the disproportionate representation of Serbs in the federal government—viewed by many Croatians as the overriding factor. The issues themselves became suffused in growing feelings of national antagonism, and rational solutions via negotiation and compromise grew even more difficult. In November 1971 a student strike in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, threatened to mature very rapidly into an outright popular and official challenge to federal authority from which there would be no retreat save through the exercise of force. It was at this critical point that Tito intervened to force the resignation of leading figures in the Croatian leadership who, although previously warned, had proved both unable and unwilling to control the course of events.

This outburst of Croatian nationalism was in many respects the culmination of a decentralization

of federal authority set in motion by economic reforms in 1965 and accelerated after the 1966 political defeat of the centralist Party secretary Aleksandar Rankovic.* Another contributing factor was the Yugoslav doctrine of self-management. In essence, self-management postulates that decisions should be taken, insofar as is practicable, by those involved in their administration or outcome. Its primary relevance has been at the enterprise level, but as Yugoslavia's ideological *raison d'etat* it has been the guiding principle of political, social, and economic organization. Between 1966 and 1971, carried by events, it served to underwrite and encourage growing republican assertiveness at the expense of Belgrade's federal powers.

This concept of loose federalism was well-ensconced when in mid-1970 the Yugoslav leadership turned its attention to preparations for the post-Tito era. Then as now, the key problem was fashioning a stable political coalition capable of accommodating the particular interests of six separate republics and two autonomous provinces. In June 1971 a series of constitutional amendments transferred to the republics comprehensive powers previously held by the federal government in Belgrade, except responsibility for defense, foreign policy, and broad economic policy. In theory the federation was to be held together by bonds of mutual interest. A 23-member Collective State Presidency grouped together representatives of the republics and provinces, and performed the often conflicting functions of policymaking and arbitration. No less the product of regional forces, the Party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), had

*Rankovic, a Serb, captained a conspiracy in 1965-1966 designed to put him in a position to succeed Tito, and possibly even to challenge his leadership. Centered in the State Security Service, especially in Serbia, its goal was to reverse the liberal trend in the country encouraged by the economic reforms and to restore greater centralism.

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also become a federal body.* In effect the country had six or more Parties.

This loose federation soon proved to have an inherent and fatal flaw. Republican leaderships succumbed to the temptation to strengthen their own political position by expanding their local constituencies, thus bolstering their relative position in the federal arena, but in the process forfeiting or compromising their monopoly of regional power. This is exactly what happened in Croatia. A portion of the Party leadership—partly by drift, partly by design, and all the while protesting its deference to federal authority—ended up in league with protagonists of Croatian nationalism. A similar trend was evident in other republics; in identifying with and articulating regional issues, republican leaders found themselves in their grip. The sacking of the Croatian leadership in December 1973 was the beginning of an assault against regional Party organizations in general. This was followed in other republican and provincial entities. Constitutional reform and political reorganization have followed purge in the second phase of an effort to anneal the Yugoslav system against future disruptions.

The country, in short, faced and continues to grapple with a crisis of authority. The aim of political reform since 1972 has been to regroup a central authority fragmented by the earlier transfer of powers to republic and provincial leaderships. Federal principles have been maintained in state and government organizations, albeit in a more restrained form. In contrast, the Party has been returned to the *principle* of democratic centralism so that it can serve, in Tito's words, as "the connective tissue which binds multinational Yugoslavia together."¹ The authority of the federal Party has been reinforced by new statutes which expand its prerogatives vis-a-vis its republican and provincial constituents. Among its most important func-

*Following Rankovic's expulsion, the central LCY secretariat had been abolished and many of its powers subsequently distributed to republican Parties. Perhaps the most radical departure in this flight from centralism was the elimination of the Central Committee's department of organizational and cadre affairs—the very core of political and administrative authority in Communist Parties, which traditionally exercises the central Party leadership's control over the *nomenklatura* system, the right to appoint all leaders in the Party and state apparatus.



Figure 2. Tito on a hunt in 1974 shortly before his 82nd birthday

tions, which lapsed into disuse and finally was abandoned in the late 1960's, is the power to scrutinize appointments to important positions in lower party organs, the administration, courts, security apparatus, and the educational system.

At the same time, it is evident that the clear and final authority of the federal LCY leadership in the *nomenklatura* system has not been reestablished. An Executive Committee portfolio for organizational and cadre affairs has been created, but the absence thus far of a convincing machinery to implement this mandate suggests a *nomenklatura* system subject to federal-republic give-and-take. In short, the sovereignty of the central Party apparatus is by no means complete. Movement toward that goal is obvious, but it does not yet appear that republican Party leaders have lost all capability to interdict federal LCY authority.

Nevertheless, the effort has been to remake the Party into a convincing, efficient apparatus of control more fully responsive to central direction, and

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to ensure that republican and provincial Parties conform to the needs of central leadership and an integral Yugoslavia, rather than vice versa. As before, the Party leadership has the character of a political coalition, but a more unified one; its members, chastened by the events of recent years, are less the simple extension of competing republican interests.

There is, however, an unmistakable smack of *déjà vu* about the reorganizations of the past two years. They remain more promise than reality, as they must for some time even under the most propitious of circumstances. They are remedies of the eleventh hour which have helped to contain pressures, but have eradicated neither fundamental problems nor the persistent feeling of uncertainty kept alive by the prospect of Tito's departure.

B. The Political Metamorphosis of the Military

Because the social and political stability of the multinational state has proven so vulnerable, and because the credibility of newly buttressed federal institutions remains untried, the Yugoslav military has come to occupy a position of major importance for the country's political future. This study examines the pattern of political involvement by the nation's military establishment, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA)* since 1971, the factors which have impinged on it, and the direction it may take in the future.

Three observations are in order at the outset. First, the relationship of Party to Army is not, nor has it ever been, simply that of two distinct, highly disciplined, rival institutions. Indeed, in contrast to most Communist states (with China the most notable exception), the institutional roots of Party and Army are the same: they grew together out of the partisan struggle, and in that early formative period were highly integrated organizationally and ideologically. The institutional identity of the military became quite distinct over time, and today its formal institutional boundaries and professional interests and attitudes are well established. But the fact that the Yugoslav military and political elite emerged from the same mould means that institu-

tional boundaries have been more permeable. The point is important because it serves to qualify military participation in the political process. Generals assigned to positions in the civilian leadership operate according to a complex code of military and Party loyalties which tend to combine rather than exclude one another. While institutional conflict or competition may exist, at the same time a respect for civilian institutions is evident. Competitive aspects of this unique Party-Army relationship are mitigated by the strong sense of identity which derives in important part from their common past.

Second, with the institutional identities of the Party and Army occasionally blurred, and with civilian and military functions sometimes overlapping (as in the case of general officers serving in nominally civilian positions), one of the most perplexing problems is how one identifies and defines the political influence of the military. Obviously, this comprises more than the formal authority or political position of professional military figures. While the Army-Party nexus at the leadership level is crucial, the scope of civil-military relations is broader and more complex. Any attempt to explain or to gauge the political relevance of the military must take account of its penetration of the Party and other civilian organizations, as well as the entire military and quasi-military establishment including the Army-Party organization, the one and a half-million-strong veterans' and reserve officers' organizations, and potential civilian constituencies whose conservative leanings might cause them to gravitate politically toward the Army.

Third, the apocalyptic scenario of a military coup is only one of a number of possible alternatives for military intervention in the political direction of the state. Barring a national calamity or a vacuum of political leadership, the exercise of political influence by the military is not likely to take such dramatic form. Rather, as is now the case, the recognizable presence of individual and institutional military authority in the political process is likely to increase. The military now serves (and in the post-Tito setting will serve even more) as a primary element in the preservation of the Yugoslav political system. Whether or not in this form it will impose itself on or encroach upon what is properly civilian authority will depend on circumstances.

*The YPA numbers approximately 264,000 men, and groups together Army (200,700), Air Force (30,000), Navy (19,300), and Frontier Guard (14,000).

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On balance, the pattern of the military's political participation thus far does not suggest a purposeful effort at political aggrandizement at the expense of civilian authority. The weaknesses of central political authority have accounted for drawing the military into a greater political role over the past few years, and while Tito's passing may accelerate this process, the military has not sought to alter its subordinate place in the Yugoslav political system. Unquestionably, a strong sense of custodianship inheres in the Yugoslav Peoples' Army which could provide both a political license and an impulse toward autonomous political behavior, especially in situations of stress or crisis. Under Yugoslav conditions the Party must be a political coalition; it is obliged to manage and balance competitive and often incompatible pressures—and in the process inevitably shares the weaknesses of any coalition. The Army has certain attributes lacking in the Party. By virtue of its organization and discipline the Army is less subject to the nationality and other disputes which have rent the Party. The Army, at the same time, is based on hierarchy, discipline and responsiveness to command, all antithetical to compromise and negotiation. The conventional image of the Army as the only "all-Yugoslav" institution must not, however, be understood to mean that it embodies a political (or ethnic) consensus. Rather, its peculiar strengths make it able to submerge or transcend political differences that would not be so restrained in the Party or the wider society. It is not and cannot be a political coalition, which means that while it may be able to transcend nationality or ethnic quarrels within its own ranks, it is ill-suited to achieve this in society at large.

Thus, the Army is not a convincing alternative to the Party in preserving and extending domestic integration, although it may serve as an instrument of such policies. It is the Party's overarching political and ideological claims which have made it the legitimate embodiment of an integral Yugoslavia. The usurping of civilian authority, is something the military establishment must eschew if it wishes to preserve the continuity of the state, its political institutions and ideological principles, from which derive the country's stability, and the legitimacy of its integrationist policies. The mil-

itary's recognition of this has served (and will continue to serve) as a strong restraint on any inclination to adopt an interventionist role—once again, short of a situation of extreme instability. It deserves to be stressed that the impulse to intervene lies more in the logic of the situation than in the Army's subjective feelings. Furthermore, it is quite likely that in order to prevent the need for its ultimate intervention the military feels constrained to participate politically now, and in the future may feel constrained to make decisions which a divided collective leadership cannot make.

Since the Croatian crisis there has been a steady expansion of military responsibility in the country's political life, a consequence both of efforts to fashion a unified leadership in anticipation of Tito's departure, and to insure the loyalty of the military. Military officials have been incorporated into the political leadership, most prominently, but by no means exclusively, in the area of internal security. They have been drawn further into the political mainstream via expanded participation in the LCY Central Committee, the Presidium, the Executive Committee, as well as on lower levels of Party and state organization.

There is a paradox in permitting the military a greater political role. If the YPA is to function along traditional and unambiguously subordinate lines, that is solely as the instrument of the Party, the latter must present a strong, stable and convincing center of power. A divided and undisciplined Party cannot hope to maintain clear control of the Army. But to the extent that the military or its leadership become essential, *de facto*, in maintaining the authority and stability of civilian institutions the relationship between the Party and the Army is altered. It becomes, so to say, politically reciprocal. While the norms, responsibilities, and functions of civilian institutions may be preserved, the influence of the military within them becomes greater. This is already in evidence to some degree. Furthermore, while military loyalty to the principle of subordination is clear, it is nevertheless conditional, not only upon the Party leadership's cohesion, but at a minimum its ability and capacity to preserve the integral Yugoslav state, and its adherence to the political course elaborated since 1971. Should that leadership or its resolve be

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seriously weakened, the Army would probably assume a more direct political role as arbiter, factional ally, or challenger.

A main question and concern—for Tito, and, more importantly, his successors—is the Party's success in asserting and insuring its control over the Army. This must be accomplished on two levels: 1) among the rank and file and officer corps, and here great attention has been given to the reorganization and revitalization of the Army Party organization and 2) at the highest level of military leadership—where one method has been integrating generals into the political leadership. In the last year the military leadership has in fact been coopted into leading civilian/political positions to an unprecedented extent in both Party and government. There is now a group of high-level officers, "political generals," whose responsibilities extend beyond the scope of their professional competence to the political process, and who have been active in shaping and implementing LCY policy. This is a species of public official which was virtually unknown in Yugoslavia, say, six years ago.

The reasons for the selection of particular individuals remains a matter of speculation but the trend itself can be explained. Some have assumed duties consistent with their professional expertise within the general sphere of internal security, and their political influence by all indications remains confined. Others have been allotted positions in the Party hierarchy where they are capable of influencing policy on a range of issues. While the integrity of the civilian position has been blurred and compromised in some cases, the identity of Party and military policies and responsibilities has been increased, with a view to precluding any gap from developing between Party and Army. On the whole, senior officers have not encroached upon civilian prerogatives in non-security areas, nor is there evidence of military pressures—other than conservative rhetoric—to push the Party (leadership) in directions it might otherwise choose not to go. This suggests that they have been coopted into the political process, rather than having insinuated themselves into it, with a view to narrowing the

margin for disagreement between Army and Party. In addition, this has narrowed institutional identities, and at lower levels, it has extended the Party's constituency within the military in a unique way. Having been given a major share of the responsibility, it is far more difficult now for generals to criticize Party or government for insufficient attention to internal security.

In projecting the Army's future role it is important to stress that the military is responsive to a locus of political and military authority now represented by Tito. It is problematic that military loyalty to the ruler and to Party-state institutions are synonymous. Tito's system of *personalisme* has provided an overarching focus for military loyalties. His immense and unassailable personal prestige has been a central factor insuring the subordination of the military and in eliciting its support and/or acquiescence for Party-defined policies in recent years. Tito's presence, in short, has imposed a stability on political-military relations. The new influence that has accrued to the military will undergo at least a quantum expansion once the force which binds civil and military authority—Tito's leadership—is no more. Potentially, the Army could bring to bear a political weight well in excess of the institutional share now accorded it. In the event of high-level political rivalry and disagreement, and without Tito as the determining point of reference, the Army—given its strong position within the system—is sure to become more of an autonomous political actor. This need not be inconsistent with civilian political supremacy, but that it will alter the shape of institutional or leadership politics in Yugoslavia is certain.

II. THE YPA AND TERRITORIAL DEFENSE

Subsequent to the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia undertook a radical reorganization of its national defense which established total popular mobilization against an invasion from the East. This revival of the partisan war concept, as well as the premium it placed on exploiting the psychological factor of ethnic identification in military activity, dictated an emphasis on command flexibility, and therefore on republican and

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communal organization and operational prerogatives at the expense, inevitably, of federal, central command authority. All Peoples' Defense (APD), as it was called, was codified in the Law on National Defense (February 1969) which provided the groundwork for the formation of Territorial Defense Organizations within each republic.

In addition to the threat of a Soviet invasion, there were important motives for All Peoples' Defense which derived from domestic considerations. As the decentralization of Party and state authority proceeded in the latter 1960's the Army remained something of an institutional anomaly—monolithic, hierarchical, centralized, immured against reforms associated with self-management, federalization and the general devolution of political authority. To republican officials bent upon aggrandizement of their authority and prerogatives, the continuance of a centralized, all-Yugoslav YPA adumbrated a threat to the rights of Yugoslavia's constituent republics. Part of the motive for instituting All Peoples' Defense was therefore to alter radically the organization of the YPA.* APD neatly embraced an effort in existence since 1967 to reduce the exclusivist character of the YPA and to enable greater republican influence in military affairs.²

In the form and context in which it was initiated, Territorial Defense threatened the professional and institutional integrity of the YPA. It was apparent that the Army would become subject to pressures for republican control and internal reforms to accommodate a pervasive federalization. Two early signs of this were increased pressures for national posting practices (i.e., stationing ethnic Serbs,

Croats, and others within their own republics) and use of multiple command languages.*

Debate over a republican defense law in Croatia in early 1971 demonstrated the difficulty of striking a balance between a genuinely Federal YPA and Republican military forces. If defense was to be "socialized" in accord with "self-management," some Croats insisted that republican officials be given wider and more explicit authority in military matters in conformity with anticipated constitutional changes in other spheres. "The constitutional changes in our political and economic system," demanded one Croatian voice, "must be a consistent expression in transforming nationwide defense and the armed forces themselves. . . . The republics and autonomous provinces, in accordance with their greater responsibility for the policy of the federation, should participate in establishing the overall policy of defense and construction of the armed forces . . ." As political debate quickened, opposing notions of federal and republican armed forces took on a mutually exclusive character. Croatian voices demanded the "sharpest opposition to attempts to separate the concept of nationwide defense from that of the self-managed society, and to the view that the self-management system is unsuitable for effective conduct of nationwide resistance,"³ views which found currency within the Army.

The central question was the command relationship between the armed forces of the Territorial Defense Organization (which was placed under a

*Johnson, A. Ross *The Yugoslav Doctrine of Total National Defense*, Rand Working Note WN-7398-ARPA, April 1971, pages 4, 23. With respect to Army resistance against diluting its hierarchical organization and its tendency to isolate itself from society, the LCY's front organization, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), called for the Army to follow the "progressive process of our society," for "a further humanization of internal roles within the YPA;" "old habits" in the YPA must be eliminated because they "could lead to shutting of the army within itself and to its isolation from society." (Resolution on the Role and Tasks of the Socialist Alliance in the Development of All Peoples' Defense and the Social Self-Protection System, *Borba*, 23 July 1971.)

*For example, a Party resolution directed the State Secretariat for National Defense, hitherto a strictly federal body, to propose by the end of 1970, "methods for equalizing the usage of national languages in the command, training and administration of the YPA." *NIN*, 12 July 1970. The 1963 constitution had specified that the official language of the YPA was Serbo-Croatian, and the 1970 demand that this rule be drastically modified was yet another impulse in the trend seeking to impose on the YPA a more nationally based concept of military organization. In contrast, after the decentralizing trend had been reversed, Article 12 of the new law on National Defense (May 1974) acknowledged that although "the principle of equality of the written and spoken languages of the nationalities and ethnic minorities shall be applied in the armed forces," nevertheless "Serbo-Croatian shall be used in command and training in the YPA." The qualified use of other languages is permitted in "certain units and institutions" at the discretion of the Federal Secretary for National Defense.

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Republican Territorial Defense military staff) and the YPA command. The Territorial Defense units were not subordinated to the YPA, perhaps the most direct alteration of Army authority.⁴ In its most significant military and political departure the February 1969 law extended to every "social-political unit" (a rubric which included republic, communal, and lower echelon bodies) the obligation and responsibility "to organize total national defense and to command the battle directly."⁵ What leeway there existed in these statutory relationships was of course never tested.

With the alarm of the 1971 Croatian nationalist crisis the slide toward greater republican power was reversed and with it the attenuation of YPA authority. The shift in the Yugoslav political center of gravity enabled the YPA to lobby for a redefinition of Territorial Defense that would restore its authority and central role, and developments since then bear the imprint of these efforts. Under the banner of "unified command authority" the Army leadership fended off critics of a centralized, unified armed forces. Speaking in March 1973 Defense Secretary Ljubicic criticized prior "concessions under bourgeois pressures" and earlier notions that the standing YPA should be trimmed, that its role should be that of "a school army," as he put it, "and that defense should be organized on the basis of territorial forces."⁶ A new law on national defense superseding the February 1969 version was promulgated in May 1974. It is designed to standardize organizational practices and hierarchical relations in All Peoples' Defense so that all republics are uniform, but simultaneously to limit republican level authority and control. The need for operational flexibility, however, precluded simply assigning complete command authority to the YPA.* As in the previous defense law the con-

*Broadly speaking, the principle is that the command of operations in a combat zone is exercised by either the YPA or the Territorial Defense Headquarters depending on to whom the task has been assigned by Supreme Headquarters—this, in turn, depending, for example, on whether the battle is a frontal one or in the enemy's rear. Headquarters of Military Districts and Territorial Defense at the Republic level are in principle co-equal, and at lower levels, Territorial Defense units and YPA divisions work together. All Territorial Defense units utilize permanent YPA cadre for training, and are more tied to the defense of a specific area—i.e., the respective republics or provinces. They can, however, be repositioned outside their national territory.

11 April 1974.

cept: "Territorial Defense marries (a) self-management and the desirability of local initiative (both viewed as essential to an efficient, self-reliant, flexible defense), and (b) the need to retain overall direction in central, federal, bodies. But, whereas interpretation of the 1969 law emphasized the first factor, the new law restores a balance, with an eye to not compromising the capabilities of the YPA in responding to domestic security contingencies. The main purpose of the national defense law is to define precisely the jurisdiction of federal and republican organs, and components of the armed forces (i.e., the YPA and TD units) in matters of national defense, and the leadership responsibility of the armed forces themselves.⁷ The comprehensive grant of authority to lower echelon commands contained in the 1969 law has been withdrawn; a more restricted formulation now labels it: "... the right and duty of every socio-political community . . . , should the country be attacked, to actually direct nationwide resistance." (Basic Principles, Section II, Para C.) This appears to confine the exercise of local command authority to an instance of foreign aggression. Notwithstanding the obvious concessions to tactical flexibility which must be made in elaborating a command structure of this type, the YPA has emerged in a strengthened and preeminent position in what is now understood as a "unified defense system."

In the prior scenario of a two-tiered system of defense the YPA's role was prescribed as a holding action which would blunt and delay the invader's attack, thus buying time for the mobilization of the country-wide territorial organization. It was also to serve as the basis for mobilization by providing the nucleus for wartime units. In its reevaluated role the YPA is viewed more as a force in being, the main striking element and core of the combined defense forces, to be organized and ready for its wartime role.⁸ According to current (and disingenuous) official explanations, the initial phase of the development of the Territorial Defense Organization was accomplished under a necessary decentralization with responsibilities given to republics and communes (*opstinas*), generally completed by 1971. The further development of the system has concentrated on the reequipping and training of the Territorial Defense units with gradual integration into the overall system, thus excluding

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any notion of a two-tiered system of defense or Republican armies. The YPA and the Territorial Defense forces are integral parts of a unified defense system. All military training in peacetime is by permanent YPA officers, and the emphasis has been placed on training territorial units in conjunction with regular YPA units.⁹ The process of integration into a unified defense structure with the YPA in the operational command role will continue.¹⁰

The program of Territorial Defense also has a political rationale, as it provides both a focus and a vehicle for developing Yugoslav unity. The system is designed to galvanize society against a variety of indigenous ideological threats. Broad popular participation in defense training and organization provide a framework for socialization in the values of cohesive Yugoslavism and self-management, for the sublimation of national and ethnic differences, and for putting new life into moribund socio-political organizations.

One such program is the adoption of compulsory pre-military training in the country's universities, originated and supervised by YPA officers.¹¹ Beginning with the 1974-75 school year, university curricula included a course entitled "Foundations of National Defense of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and will later entail formation of student units by faculties, as well as field training for 20-day periods. It provides the military an unprecedented place in the universities, and authorizes a system of centralized pre-military training under Army control which effectively bypasses republican authority. It is also part of the increased attention the Army has been devoting to youth.¹² A political indoctrination program for elementary school children has also been established. Under the supervision of YPA political officers, the main theme will be justification of the military and military service. Both programs are further illustrations of the YPA's emergence as the dominant and controlling element in the overall structure of national defense and its primacy over the Territorial Organization.¹³

The association of professional military personnel with a self-managing defense system stressing the dispersal of authority has proven an uncomfortable one in many ways. For example, in February 1973

the LCY Presidium's Commission for All Peoples' Defense discussed the place and role of work organizations (i.e., a factory, or other production or business establishment) in preparation for All Peoples' Defense. In a rather pointed statement the Presidium said that All Peoples' Defense "must be much more broadly and comprehensively determined by self-managing agreements and statutes, rather than by regulations on national defense. This breaks with the practice that the question of defense and self-protection is *a matter for only professional services*, and commissions for All Peoples' Defense and directors of enterprises."¹⁴ Thus, the Presidium in effect admonished the YPA not to interpret its critical role in All Peoples' Defense as giving it exclusive responsibility in practical, day-to-day All Peoples' Defense affairs. Such monopoly behavior has hindered the genuine involvement of broad sections of the public in the operation of All Peoples' Defense.¹⁵

Thus, an earlier trend toward restricting the responsibility of the YPA in the implementation of All Peoples' Defense has been reversed. While the system of Yugoslav defense is based on both separate territorial units and command structures, and the regular YPA, the distinction between the two is not as sharply or as clearly drawn especially in terms of command hierarchy and personnel, and training. Furthermore, the emphasis on a "unified command system"¹⁰ and the central importance this accords to the Federal Secretariat of National Defense, and through it to the YPA, as well as the stress on integrating the system of defense (with the YPA in the leading role) have rendered moot the question of territorial armies and republican authority in military affairs, and have eliminated these as threats to the YPA—at least for the foreseeable future. Despite these changes, contradictions are implicit in the continued development of national territorial forces. In some ways Territorial Defense has rationalized the YPA's greater exposure to the national question. For example, it obliges more extensive national postings of officers, a practice that earlier was avoided almost entirely. What longer term repercussions this might have is impossible to foresee.

As it has come to be interpreted, the doctrine of Territorial Defense has reinforced the central importance of the YPA. These revisions cannot, however, be construed as the sole or direct result of military

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influence or pressure. Obviously, the political logic of Yugoslavia's development in recent years, above all the need to restrain "republicanism," to restore meaningful authority to the federal level, and to anticipate instability, has dictated such change. Nevertheless, the new exigencies have drawn the military center-stage, enhanced their political influence, and have generally favored Army interests.

III. THE MILITARY AND THE 1971 CROATIAN CRISIS

The Croatian crisis in December 1971 marked a watershed in the Army's emergence as a political force. The pattern of military involvement during this period may be instructive in anticipating future settings. It shows that military support was a *sine qua non* in permitting Tito to deal decisively with the group of Croatian leaders who were judged guilty of nationalism; that while the military was reluctant to challenge civilian authority, Army leaders worked within established and informal channels to insure that their point of view prevailed; and that the Croatian crisis fundamentally altered the relationship between the Party and the military.

As indicated earlier, in the few years before developments in Croatia came to a head, the military organization and its unified command structure became the subject of pressures for republican control and internal reform. The prospect loomed that as a matter of natural progression, the prevailing trends toward decentralization would encroach upon, and later subvert, the Army's integrity, cohesion, and its capacity to act as an all-Yugoslav force in the event of internal crisis. Acting originally more out of an urge toward institutional preservation than a desire to intrude into the political process, the Army leadership became a participant in the debate over what form Yugoslav federalism was to take. Its earlier posture had been to seal off the YPA from these decentralizing pressures by stressing its institutional exclusiveness: the hierarchical nature of the military institution and its need to preserve an integral all-Yugoslav character precluded organizational forms based on self-management. After the Ninth LCY Congress in 1969 this argument was no longer viable because of the gathering strength of republicanism and the re-

orientation of defense policy to the doctrine of All Peoples' Defense.

As the portents of nationalism in Croatia grew more ominous in the spring of 1971, it became obvious that a defense policy which stressed the decentralization of military authority threatened to compromise Belgrade's ability to utilize the military in dealing effectively with domestic strife or with an insubordinate republican leadership. As security priorities and considerations changed, this contradiction in defense policy became more evident. Some rethinking must have been undertaken to insure that the instruments of internal security would be sufficiently responsive should a crisis ensue. In April at the crucial Brioni Plenum of the LCY Presidium (the 17th session), the Party leadership reaffirmed its commitment to achieving the equality of Yugoslavia's nationalities through decentralization. At the same time, however, a conspicuous warning was issued that the state security organs had been weakened by the penetration of nationalist elements and that they must be strengthened and made more effective.¹⁷

At the 18th session of the LCY Presidium held in Belgrade on 2 June a certain tension was perceptible in Party-military relations. The contradiction between a system and doctrine of defense, which was designed to cope with an attack by a foreign aggressor but which instead might be needed in a situation of internal revolt, were now of concern to the military leadership. A political leadership locked into a concept of republican sovereignty (and inclined to deprecate the danger of nationalism, as Tito had, partly because he doubted the federal Party's ability to act against it) which prefigured a nationally based or nationally controlled military in Croatia had to face up to this dilemma. Either through entreaty or pressure the military leadership made the point that the Army must not become subject to the conditional agreement of republican authority. In a report on the state of Yugoslav defense policy the Presidium was told that the Territorial Defense system had radically altered the place of the YPA in the country's defense, that it had "overcome the state-centralistic type of defense organization," and had dispersed responsibility for defense to all "social organizations." In view of the uncertainties raised by Croatian developments, however, a certain con-

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fusion was apparent in both Army and Party over how to continue in matters of security policy. One high military official, the Chairman of the Presidium's Commission of National Defense, sounded the following warning:

. . . We must resolutely resist all unitarian tendencies in the field of organizing the nationwide defense system; at the same time, however, we must also resist more energetically all nationalistic deformations of the self-managing society. This all the more so because [the Army]—observing these things from the defense point of view—is concerned because of recent nationalistic phenomena. . . .¹⁸

He went on to advocate a greater say for the central government in the formation of Territorial Defense units.

The Army clearly felt that its priority attention must be given to the possibility of domestic strife rather than foreign aggression. In one opinion poll a large majority of officers and NCOs singled out nationalism and chauvinism as the main dangers to the country; very few, roughly 12 percent, thought foreign aggression the most likely source of conflict.¹⁹ Similarly, public statements by Yugoslav military officials in mid-1971 warned that effective defense of the country was threatened by the brewing crisis in Croatia.²⁰

During the pre-December 1971 period, military leaders became increasingly visible as spokesmen on internal affairs.²¹ Rumor abounded that a military putsch had either been attempted or was being planned. Lt. Gen. Djoko Jovanic, Commander of the Zagreb Military District, told his officers that the YPA had "a clearly defined role: to fight foreign enemies. Therefore, there is no real danger that the Army could become an instrument in the solution of internal difficulties, *except in the case where constitutional order is threatened.*"²² [Emphasis added.] This statement of the Army's qualified willingness to intervene registered military alarm. Along with other statements it showed that the Army was both prodding the civilian leadership, and was prepared to contribute to internal stabilization in Croatia if necessary.

There was clear concern, however, that the Army would act on its own. The Croatian Chief of Staff

of the Zagreb Military District, Lt. Col. Gen. Janko Bobetko, urged the Croatian Central Committee to place the Army under strict supervision.*²³ Yugoslav media openly responded to the rumors of military intervention in an effort to prove them false, citing as proof of the YPA's loyalty its support of the Territorial Defense System (which had entailed the surrender of their absolute military authority) and the fact that no sudden shifts of command in the military districts had occurred.²⁴

It is clear that the Yugoslav military leaders had strong apprehensions and conveyed them to Tito. But it does not appear that they actually took an *independent* stand in the Croatian crisis, confronting him with an ultimatum to oust the errant Croatian leadership faction. On 11 December Tito received "a group of active and retired Army generals, the top leaders of the YPA and Territorial Defense units," according to official press accounts, to inform them of his decision.** Other reports suggested that they had remonstrated with Tito to deal firmly with Croatian problems.²⁵ Later in the wake of the December confrontation much media output was given over to explicit denials that the Army had forced Tito's hand, that it had taken any other position than one wholly responsive to Tito's political leadership. "I can say with all responsibility," said Vladimir Bakaric, at the time Croatian representative on the 15-member Executive Bureau of the LCY Presidium, the Party's leading body, "that the Army has never exerted political pressure of any kind or threatened Tito with a coup."²⁶ The veteran Croatian politician minimized the Army's present and future internal role and argued that open military intervention was not an alternative in maintaining social and political order because it would itself trigger civil war. Bakaric did

*Bobetko, a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC CC), was charged with nationalism and purged with the Croatian leadership at the 23rd session LCC CC on December 12, 1971.

**Tanjug, 11 December 1971.

Tito asked them for their complete support and pleaded for unity in the Army. He also told them that henceforth he wanted Croatian troops stationed in the Eastern republics (presumably Serbia) and Serbian troops in the Western republics (Croatia), a practice abandoned ten years earlier. The session recalled a similar meeting Tito held with military leaders in 1966 just before the ouster of Rankovic.

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acknowledge a "certain potential danger" from the Army and its unpredictability in a time of grave political crisis. But he concluded that, "the Army does not serve to keep order in the country; its only task is to protect the Yugoslav borders from external enemies." Following this widely publicized statement, however, Tito overruled Bakaric and asserted that he would not permit a situation of domestic strife to break out or to remain unchecked, that he would call upon the Army, the "ultimate means," to establish order. "The task of our Army," said Tito, "is not merely to defend the territorial integrity of our country, but also to defend our socialism when we see that it is in danger and cannot be defended by other means."²⁷

Given the military's concerned but deferential behavior in the months preceding the crisis it is unlikely that they would have delivered a direct ultimatum to Tito. More important, however, was Bakaric's observation that the Army was *capable* of acting independently, which, while it conveyed an understandably more apprehensive Croatian point of view, qualified Tito's outward confidence in the military. The Marshal recognized the necessity of having the Army securely behind him, but, other considerations apart, he was eager not to bring the Army directly to bear for fear of forfeiting a measure of his political control over both it and the situation. As the atmosphere of crisis mounted in December 1971, the entreaty of the military leadership was an important factor in precipitating Tito's intervention against the Croatian leadership. In the event, the military leadership probably approached Tito more as negotiant and less as a compliant subordinate willing to implement decisions in which they had no part.

Following the confrontation and ouster of the discredited Croat leadership, the Army surfaced in a visibly more political and outspoken posture. A newfound license was evident for the military to criticize openly those non-military aspects of the country's political life about which it was alarmed. In one controversial pronouncement, for example, Chief of Staff, Col. Gen. Viktor Bubanj, bluntly singled out "ideological and moral deviations from the revolution," and by implication their advocates in the leadership, as the root cause of existing

difficulties. This assertiveness was a departure from past behavior; its tone was loyalist, but avuncular. Such criticism was wide-ranging, extending to culture and the economy, but it tended to focus on the preservation of civil peace and military preparedness, and the restoration of discipline in party life.²⁸ The exceptional prominence of the military in the political debate was regarded by one Yugoslav observer as a public signal of the

open, national beginning of the politicization of the Army," and potentially of its "decisive political influence [in] decision-making and perhaps even leadership."²⁹

This was perhaps an extravagant appraisal of military influence in the uncertain weeks after the Croatian crisis. But it did correctly interpret clear support from the military as conditional upon the success of the Party's efforts to consolidate itself and the country as a whole. The article breached official views concerning the role of the military and it was strongly criticized for suggesting that the YPA adopt the position of "bureaucratic arbiter."²⁹

An accurate and detailed account of the interplay between Party and military hierarchies during this period is impossible. But a number of observations can be made: First, the military was reluctant to be cast in the role of political arbiter, and insisted that its actions were and would continue to be determined by its subordination to the Party, a version of events that the Party leadership sought to project as well.³⁰ Second, the military demonstrated sufficient, albeit qualified, confidence that with its backing the Party could cope with the situation, while at the same time reserving for itself the possibility of a more direct role. Indeed, in contrast to the Army's own hesitant view of its domestic role of some months earlier, military intervention at the Party's behest had now been legitimized by Tito's comments that he would not shrink from using the Army.³¹ Third, through its frequent disclaimers the military showed that it was aware

*Primož Zagarij, "The Politicization of the Army or a Deliberation About the Future," *Problemi*, #108 (January or February 1972). The author went on to countenance the enhanced political importance of the military, and his views probably reflected the inchoate sentiments of some conservative elements both within and outside the YPA who tended to see a certain redemptory force in the Army's increased political influence.

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of the liabilities in assuming a more overt political role, above all the inevitable resistance this would meet in Croatia.³²

One factor which served to insure the subordination of the military and which continues to do so is the strong urge shared by all, military leaders included, to preserve unity in Yugoslavia's leadership. Military spokesmen frequently stressed the interdependence of LCY unity and internal stability as essential to the country's external defense. Defense Minister Ljubicic told an LCY CC plenum in June 1972 that Communists in the Army wanted an authoritative and decisive LCY Presidium which must insure Yugoslav unity: "... only those small countries which have achieved firm internal unity and steadiness can resist foreign pressures successfully." Similarly, unity in the country's political life must have its equivalent in the military sphere. Ljubicic told the Central Committee, "Only if the policy of the LC (i.e., the imposition of discipline and central authority) is consistently implemented in all structures can Communists in the YPA insure

the necessary unity in our armed forces—the unity of command and of control of all forces on Yugoslav territory in the event of aggression." [Emphasis added.]

Thus, by mid-1972 the new ambience of discipline and the expansion of the YPA's influence combined to reverse earlier pressures which had threatened its authority and importance. The introduction of multiple command languages and measures to accord republics more control in military affairs were now presented by Army spokesmen as nationalist efforts to "penetrate" the Army.³³ The mixture of republican and federal authority in territorial defense would now be "arranged and organized so as to ensure unity in the command and direction of the armed forces . . . in particular, it must satisfy the needs of the supreme command with regard to exerting influence in the involvement of Territorial Defense and its various battle areas or over the entire Yugoslav theater."³⁴

IV. YUGOSLAVIA'S VETERANS: STEWARDS OF THE REVOLUTION

Yugoslavia's powerful veterans' groups provide the military with a major lever of political influence. While there is only scant and fragmentary concrete evidence to prove their systematic manipulation by the YPA, it seems safe to conclude that veterans' demonstrative behavior reflects political attitudes widespread in the Army itself. Throughout 1971 and 1972 the Union of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia (SUBNOR) was a prominent part of the conservative groundswell which rallied against nationalist activity in Croatia, then against the political insubordination of the liberal Serbian leadership, and finally against the general trend toward decentralization of political authority.* The veterans showed themselves capable of acting independently of republican Party organizations and in response to Army influence. Their independence



Figure 3. Gen. Nikola Ljubicic, Federal Secretary for National Defense (pre-Oct 74)

SUBNOR was founded in 1947 and comprised over 800,000 Communist partisans. The Party itself numbered 260,000 at the time and its leadership and that of the Veterans Union were identical. Today SUBNOR numbers some 1,350,000 and is closely associated with over 400,000 members of the Federation of Reserve Officers and Non-commissioned Officers.

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is explained in large part by their close relationship with the YPA, a fact which induces caution by the Party in dealing with them

The strength of the veterans and their determination lies in the fact that they are a well-organized group whose cohesion is the product of a shared wartime experience, and, more immediately, of the common attitudes and the ideological rectitude of a politically déclassé social stratum. Having once occupied a favored place in society, they grew disaffected during the mid-1960's as a result of personnel policies which sought to minimize participation in the partisan war as the criterion for political and social mobility. The vanguard of the revolution found itself "driven out of public and political life in various ways: [veterans] had been pensioned off or proclaimed conservative or too old."³⁶ The watershed of the Croatian crisis meant a change of course for Yugoslav society and the LCY as well as a turning point in the political fortunes of veterans. It seemed to vindicate their widely held resentments, and it held out the prospect that lost privilege and status might in some measure be regained, and that veterans might be returned to the political and social mainstream.

Between 1947 and his forced resignation in 1966, Aleksandar Rankovic served as the permanent president of the Veterans' Union, and it came to be very much the extension of his attitudes and the instrument of his objectives. The veterans' organization had been the pool from which Party, Army, state and economic cadre were recruited, and veterans monopolized the country's elite. The ouster of Rankovic signalled the beginning of the collapse of the veterans' powerful political-bureaucratic position. Their patron gone, the veterans fell victim to new imperatives in elite recruitment policy. As a result of the 1965 economic reform and the change in leadership attitudes which accompanied it, a premium on political loyalty gave way to more pragmatic considerations of technical and managerial skills. Politically disenfranchised, veterans not only lost their unique accessibility to the political, administrative leadership, but were gradually replaced in favor of younger men distinguished by their education or professional exper-

tise.* Typical of the common resentments which veterans feel, one complained that "while he had planted this tree (the Republic) the fruit is now being picked by others."³⁷

Veterans viewed the transfer of legislative and executive powers to the republics and provinces through constitutional reforms (adopted by the Federal Assembly in June 1971) and the affirmation of republican sovereignty with considerable misgivings. In Croatia itself, the disproportionate representation of Serbs in the Veterans' Union (due to the pattern of partisan recruitment in the early part of the war) sharpened that organization's apprehensions over nationalist phenomena, and they were therefore the first to react. One prominent veteran, Lt. Col. Gen. (Ret.) Rade Bulat, opposed the draft Croatian constitution in a debate in the Croatian assembly, and demanded that Croatia itself be federalized in order to protect the interests of the Serbian population.³⁸

In the wake of the Croatian leadership purge the veterans' and reserve Army officers' association emerged as a source of orthodox, almost atavistic, pressure. In open disagreement with the moderation and relative caution being shown by the LCY, and acting for the most part not through their national leadership, but rather from communal-level associations, they charged that extirpation of nationalist and liberalist sentiments was not thoroughgoing, and punishment of its proponents insufficient.

*The extent of this premature and much-resented displacement is illustrated by the following figures: of 788,518 veterans and 165,358 retired army officers (1970 figures), 56.8 percent were under 55 years of age, and 20.5 percent were between 39 and 45. Of a total of 437,709 veterans in Serbia, only 32 percent were employed in 1972 and 66 percent were retired. Furthermore, forced retirements from military service following the improvement in relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1950's and after (as well as massive dismissals from the security service after 1966) created a huge group of men under 50 who were subject to the reentry problems associated with the new personnel standards of the economic reform. In 1971, the average age of retired officers was 44 years. A survey in the same year of the elite group of veterans, known as "first fighters," those who joined the partisan effort in 1941, revealed that half had been retired from their functions before pension age, 27 percent had an income below the established minimum, and that despite this, they complained most of the lack of prestige, their social isolation and inactivity. Antic, *op. cit.*, "Political Influence of. . ."; Radio Belgrade, 19 February 1973.

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Calling for a more radical cadre policy, Pero Car, president of the Croatian SUBNOR warned that

... exaggerated caution and consideration—so as to avoid by chance calling to political responsibility a comrade who may not be very much at fault—would lead to the situation that the counter-revolution will again be topical in six months.”³⁹ The veterans’ surprisingly assertive posture vis-a-vis the Party extended to criticism of lax LCY attitudes in dealing decisively with such phenomena as the growth of excessive social differences, the accumulation of wealth, and artistic dissidence, trends which in their view amounted to the political and moral deterioration of Yugoslav society. Furthermore, they arrogated to themselves the right to an independent role in checking these excesses. SUBNOR Secretary General Sekic warned that an irresolute response by the LCY to continuing political deviation left veterans the choice of remaining silent or “independently taking political initiative.”⁴⁰

Some organizations of war veterans and military officers argued that revisionist reforms and decentralization had paved the way for nationalism and other excesses, and urged an abandoning of the reformist system and a return to centralization.⁴¹

The LCY responded by lashing out publicly against the veterans and their strategy of operating contrary to Party policy and organization. “... Along with nationalist pressure,” said one frontal assault on the veterans, “we are also faced with a more intensive and open neo-Stalinist pressure.” They were condemned as a “neo-Stalinist revanche” by party leaders,* and warned that “... action against nationalism today cannot bring about, in any form, even the partial reaffirmation of unitarism.” The veterans were also rebuked for their tendency to regard themselves as the very repository of revolutionary values:

“There is no room in the League of Communists for a revolutionary aristocracy, and even less is there any room for it outside the League.”⁴²

The federal veterans’ and reserve officers’ associations rejected such charges. But the insubordination of communal groups continued, veterans

*E.g., by Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the LCY Presidium’s Executive Bureau speaking at the January 1972 LCY Conference.

in fact challenging the very unity that the LCY leadership was determined to restore. In joint sessions of communal Party and veterans’ committees the latter criticized party policy from dogmatic positions and urged an expanded application of guilt-by-association for those who acquiesced in the Croatian “national movement.” The attempt was made, in effect, to supersede the political authority of the Party.

Tito and the Party leadership showed a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the veterans, carefully admonishing them for their conservative zeal, at the same time showing an awareness of the need for their support. “Apart from the Communist Party and the Socialist Alliance,” said Tito, “our most important organization is the Veterans’ Federation. . . . There are perhaps still some unsolved problems. . . . But in the past the Veterans’ Federation was always a powerful pillar of our socialist society.”⁴³ Addressing veterans on 4 July 1972, Veterans’ Day, Edvard Kardelj protested the LCY’s

gratitude to the veterans and the continuing importance of their support: “Those who push the partisans and veterans of the Liberation Front to the periphery of social events do not do this because they perhaps favor the affirmation of the younger generation. They in fact attack the revolution.”⁴⁴

But he cautioned the veterans not to be manipulated by “ideological and political protagonists of bureaucratic dogmatic socialism.” Kardelj acknowledged the veterans’ inclination to see themselves on the losing side of a generation gap, pushed aside by modernization, liberalization, and a younger, educated elite. He claimed, however, that talk of a generational cleavage was artificial, and that while youth represented no unique social stratum, the revolution must make way for it.

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of veterans’ activity was their ability to operate at will and with impunity outside the Party’s jurisdiction. Croatian Party President Milka Planinc, since her elevation to that position in December 1971, had been engaged in efforts to bring recalcitrant Croatian veteran groups to heel.⁴⁵ Tito lent his support to these efforts urging that the veterans’ organization must be the “vehicle of the stands of the LC” and must operate within and not outside the Party.⁴⁶ He felt obliged at the same time, however, to laud

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their steadfastness and immunity to deviations, a tribute to their independent political weight. The federal SUBNOR leadership offered regular denials that veterans were working outside the Party, but reiterated that their active political influence would continue. The exchange of such public remonstrances apparently had little effect on curtailing veterans' activities at a lower level, and as political consolidation stretched to Serbia and the Vojvodina in late 1972 the veterans again surfaced as the sponsors of a more radical purge.*

In Croatia oppositional activity by veterans' groups has persisted, fueled by Serb-Croat hostilities. The lines of opposition between Party and veterans sharpened in February 1974 when the top Croatian leaders, Vladimir Bakaric and Jure Bilic, attacked a "centralist faction" in the republican Party based on a Serbian or "greater state" platform.**⁴⁷ Bakaric noted that both Serbs and Croats were involved, and that "they would like to see us hang every person who in whatever way was on the other side," that is those who had shown any sympathy toward Croatian nationalism. While he refrained from naming them explicitly, his allusions made it clear that veterans, reserve officers and centralists were one and the same. Another attack followed, this one by President of the Croatian Republican Assembly Jakov Blazevic. "Stalinist and greater state hegemonistic restoration" forces, he said, had been active in opposing preparation of new Croatian and Yugoslav constitutions which, they in-

*The so-called "Tito letter" of October 1972 provided the Party consolidation campaign with a new momentum, and the veterans with a new point of departure. In an effort to put an end to internecine Party squabbling, and attempts to deflect the purge begun after the LCY "Action Program" of January 1972, the Letter served (and serves) as a programmatic document which stipulated, inter alia 1) the reintroduction of democratic centralism, 2) a further purge of individuals "alien to the party's ideology and policy," 3) increased ideological work at all levels, and 4) "consolidation of the LCY's role and influence in culture policy" in the economy, education, the media, public administration, the security organs and courts.

**In the official rhetoric the accusation of "centralism" or "unitarism" signifies those elements, inherently pro-Serb, anti-federalist, and opposed to the Titoist position, who would favor a form of state organization in which administration and decision-making were restricted to the Belgrade center. The *bête noire* of most Croats, "centralism" recalls both the Serbian hegemony of the interwar period as well as the aspirations of Rankovic.

sisted, compromised the interests of the working class and weakened ties within the Federation "to such an extent that it would in fact be transformed into a confederation."*⁴⁸

The veterans were only one element of an obdurate anti-Bakaric coalition in Croatia. Of greater importance are the links to or support of the veterans' activity by the active military. During 1972 and 1973 Tito's highly conservative security advisor, Gen. Ivan Miskovic, had addressed the Osijek garrison (a center of veterans' activities) in Croatia on a number of occasions and urged them to take an assertive position vis-a-vis the Party. In April 1974 Tito was reportedly forced to intervene against Croatian centralist elements because they were attempting to enlist the support of military officers. Defense Minister Ljubicic was dispatched to Croatia to issue a stern warning to individuals identified as members of the centralist faction.**

What is known of veterans' political involvement in Croatia since 1971 suggests a pattern in which leading figures have been retired generals from Croatia, most, but not all of them, ethnic Serbs. As an organization the veterans in Croatia have demonstrated considerable pertinacity in opposing the

*Veterans had articulated misgivings that the Party's controlling role within the organs of the federation was not stipulated clearly enough in new constitutional arrangements, and that federal officials were not insured sufficient authority vis-a-vis the republics. They also insisted upon measures to guarantee the more equitable distribution of income and more rigid control of the market. Despite the fact that federal principles were to be maintained, veterans argued, "the basic requirement is that the workers class (read: the Party) must truly assume power in the commune and in the republic because it will thereby also assume power in the federation." (Borba, 7 October 1973, 8 October 1973.) Veterans' continuing objections to the new constitution were confirmed once again in July 1974. Many members of SUBNOR had "severely criticized" the new Yugoslav constitution because it displayed an insufficient degree of centralism. (██████████ 15 July 1974, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 25X1A2g

**Among them Pero Car, president of the Croatian Veterans Association; Lt. Col. Gen. (Ret.) Nikola Vidovic, also a leading veterans official; and Drago Smoljanovic, member of the Republican Chamber of the Croatian Assembly (a YPA Colonel in 1971 and president of the Military Court of Zagreb). All were associated with an early condemnation of the nationalist deviations in Croatia. (██████████ 29 April, 1974, SECRET)

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dominant moderate republican political line and leadership. This opposition has been carried on with relative impunity from the central LCY leadership,* which is indicative of the limits imposed on Party policy toward the veterans by the latter's close association with the active military. The veterans' putative attempt to enlist the cooperation of regional military leaders is additional evidence of such links. The veterans' opposition has been driven by lingering apprehensions concerning Croat nationalism, by the veterans' conservative proclivities, and of course by Serb-Croat ethnic antagonism. Areas of Croatia identifiable as the centers of veterans' activity are those populated heavily by Serbs. The veterans themselves have not comprised a separate faction, but have been a powerful, probably the central, element in a conservative coalition, in which shared sentiments have extended to at least a portion of the regional military leadership. The veterans have thus seemed the political surrogates of the military. One is on little more than speculative ground in imputing such anti-Croat sympathies to military leaders simply by virtue of their nationality. Nonetheless, Serb domination of the military hierarchy in Croatia seems to be established policy as it probably serves, in Belgrade's view, as an additional check on Croatian nationalist deviation. The recent appointment of Lt. Col. Gen. Dusan Corkovic, a Serb from Croatia, as commander of the Zagreb Military District in the face of reported opposition from the Croatian leadership (presumably Bakarić) would corroborate this. Corkovic replaced Gen. Djoko Jovanic, also a Serb.⁴⁶ For similar reasons a veterans' lobby in Croatia wary of any signs of nationalism may not be an altogether undesirable development from Belgrade's point of view.

In Yugoslavia as a whole the veterans remain a powerful conservative and quasi-independent force, which the party, cognizant of the importance of their support as well as their ties with the YPA, is unwilling (or unable) to bridle completely. In com-

*This has been true not only in Croatia. Osman Karabegovic, a prominent veteran from Bosnia, was severely censured for his centralist views and expelled from the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1972. Despite this, and in the face of opposition by Branko Mikulic, president of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was recently elected Bosnian representative to the federal SUBNOR. [REDACTED]
74, 15 July 1974, SECRET)

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parison to their position four years ago, they now have a political mandate which extends well beyond the protection and pursuit of immediate interests such as pensions. In the words of one veterans' official, they are "no longer reconciled to standing on the side away from the total social activity."⁵⁰ They claim the distinction of being able "more than anybody else [to] feel and identify the activities of class enemies."⁵¹ Furthermore, while the veterans' republican and federal leaderships have made an effort to eliminate indiscipline in lower level organizations, the latter continue to exercise a political influence in accord with this mandate in areas of culture and the economy. The rank and file remain a reservoir of activist conservative sentiment which could be tapped or spring to life spontaneously should events provide the stimulus.

V. INSURING POLITICAL CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY

A. The Army Party Organization

The more the Yugoslav Army cultivates an attitude of exclusiveness, the more it exists as a well-defined, professional institution separate and apart from society, the less subject it is to routine political control, and the more capable of autonomous political and military behavior it is, especially in a time of crisis or near-crisis. With the future domestic application of force a prospect, and with the military institution subject to many of the same cleavages as society at large, the LCY leadership is determined to insure both its subordination and cohesion. In a period, therefore, in which the military and its loyalty to the Party and fidelity to its political direction have become of crucial importance, the LCY has undertaken a vigorous revitalization of the Army Party organization—the Conference of the Organization of the League of Communists in the YPA—with a view to giving it greater supervisory capacities and expanded influence in military matters, including such important ones as promotion.

Tito has often made the claim that the Army stood firmly and united behind the Party leadership in its rout of the dissident Croatian faction, and thereafter in its purge of other republican leaderships. But the Party's approach to the management of the military, and its efforts to consolidate its hold

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on the Army since the Croatian upheaval somewhat belie Tito's unqualified confidence. In October 1972, for example, the Army Party organization had 80,000 members. As of January 1973 the figure had been reduced to 66,475.⁵² The turnover suggests, or rather confirms, that the Army Party organization—the military's most politically disciplined corps—proved susceptible to the same pressures as the Party as a whole and required similar surgery.

In the Zagreb Army District, for example, the League of Communists was completely reconstituted (presumably having been earlier disbanded), in January 1973, a full year after the crisis had been extinguished. The length of time is a measure of the depth and scale of disunity engendered by the 1971 political crisis within the Croatian YPA Party organization. Indeed, the primary objective set at the January constituent session was "to insure that the military commands, units, and institutions will be morally-politically and ideologically united."⁵³ In retrospect, the statement raised questions about the Army's ability to act decisively had it been called upon to do so. To be sure, political/organizational deterioration in the military in Croatia was probably more acute than elsewhere. But the fact that membership turnover and subsequent consolidation efforts were not confined to Croatia are indications that the phenomenon was more widespread.

A major effort has been launched to reinvigorate the authority of the Army Party organization.⁵⁴ Broadly put, there have been three objectives. First, to restructure the network of Party organization in the YPA so that it extends more effectively to the basic units of Army organization. The number of basic organizations has been doubled and their membership halved, each one now comprising 60-65 members. They are now established on the battalion instead of the regimental level, in closer proximity to the basic activity of troops. As in the Party at large, an emphasis has been placed on recruiting workers.⁵⁵ Second, to wed the Army Party organization more firmly and more directly to the central LCY apparatus with a view to increasing the latter's influence within the YPA and to discourage any separate identification. It is reiterated frequently and pointedly that the Army Party organization must be an "integral part" of the LCY. Third, to combat fissiparous political and social pressures within the Army in the hope of immunizing it




Figure 4. Lt. Col. Gen. Dzemil Sarac, Chairman of the Conference of the Organization of the League of Communists in the YPA. Member of the LCY Presidium (Jun 74)

against them. Indoctrination and socialization efforts have been reemphasized, and ideology is now presented as the determining factor in enabling "all cadres to perform their functional duties efficiently."⁵⁶ Thus, an effort has been made to increase the strength, role, and presence of the Party organization and to insure its closer access to regular military activities. Among its most important new mandates is to oversee officer promotion policy and to insure that the "ideological orientation and activity of individuals" are given prominent consideration.

An additional change in its status in relation to the regional Party organizations has transformed the Army Party organization—and through it the Army itself—into a potential counterweight to republican and provincial regional parties. Previous Party statutes obliged the Central Committees of the republican parties to "realize regular and active ideological-political contacts with the LCY organization in the Army located in the territory of the

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republic," to follow the work of the Party units in the Army, and "to harmonize their activities." In a political setting characterized by the growing independence of the republican Parties, these ground rules naturally gave rise to the impulse and tendency to dominate the respective Army Party organizations to insure that their activities and positions did not conflict with republican autonomy. In keeping with Belgrade's subsequent efforts to circumscribe the independence of republican Party organizations, new Party statutes (valid since the 10th LCY Congress in May 1974) free the Army Party organizations from supervision by the republican Parties and establish a coequal status.* With an eye to preserving the monolithic unity of the Army Party organization, the former statutory appellation, "organizations," has been replaced with the singular, "organization," thus precluding a repetition of attempts to federalize it. The point of these measures is to render the Army Party organization responsible to and responsive to the central LCY. The new statutes (Paragraph 52) also extend the coequal status of the Army Party organization to "responsibility for the establishment and implementation of the views and policy line of the LCY," thus prescribing the Army's institutional participation in the political process, and eliminating the license of republican and other lower level party bodies to monitor their Army counterparts.

This reorganization creates, in effect, a Party organization on each hierarchical level of govern-

*The newly included portion (Paragraph 56, Section VI) reads:

"Central Committees of the LC of the socialist republics and forums of the LC of the armed forces shall link together in the domains of political ideology and action, shall conduct joint activity, shall keep one another informed, and shall see that their organizations cooperate in implementing the policy of the LCY and stands that have been jointly adopted.

Organizations, forums, and organs in the autonomous provinces, major cities and opstinas, and units of the Yugoslav National Army shall establish direct links in the domains of political ideology and action, shall inform one another, and shall cooperate in the area where they are located.

Forums and organs of the LC in the socialist republics, autonomous provinces and opstinas, and in organizations of the LC in the Yugoslav National Army shall jointly determine the forms for their mutual linkage and cooperation in the domains of political ideology and action."

ment—republic and provincial, city and communal—which is not subject to the gamut of republican or local political pressures. What is more, given their greater responsiveness to central direction and the fact that the military is sympathetic to Party policies which favor federal authority, they presumably represent centrally-formulated policies and views. It is doubtful that the respective Army Party organizations will have a decisive influence in the political process through these horizontal links to other party bodies. Nevertheless, they have a statutory and political significance previously denied them.*

The extension of Party authority in the Army has not met with uncritical acceptance in the professional officers corps. There is evidence that it has fostered differences over the basic issue of professional military authority, as well as over priorities in allocations of manpower and resources, training time, etc. Responding to such criticism one Party official stated that "... those who object that 'we are interfering with the competence of others' are not right, because for the Communists in the Army not a single question is or can be outside their sphere of interest, and even their influence."⁷ There is little to suggest, however, that while disputes may persist, they will not remain within manageable proportions.

What Army-Party differences exist over the new efforts to consolidate political control seem to revolve most around the extent of political-ideological work, many professional (i.e., non-political) officers skeptical of its utility. Minister of Defense Ljubicic has spoken of the importance of emphasizing simultaneously the "specialist and ideopolitical level of command cadres," and has warned that "the view [was] starting to form in certain Army quarters that technology has the decisive importance in war," something that could lead to underestimating the moral-political factor.⁵⁸ Programmatic docu-

*A 1972 proposal from Croatia submitted to the Coordination Commission of the Federal Constitutional Commission asked that military garrisons form special Army delegations to participate as a unit in communal assemblies. Critics argued that because the Army expressed the general interest of the whole of Yugoslav society it should not be involved in "the confrontation of partial interests of communes, economic groups, factories, and groups of citizens"

The proposal was evidently discarded. CF. *Borba*, 15 March 1972.

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ments stipulate that accelerated ideological work must receive priority attention,* and yet criticism of lagging interest by officers reflects the resistance with which the campaign has been greeted, even within the Army Party organization. A November 1973 study of the problem revealed that one-third of the Army's Party members had not involved themselves sufficiently.⁵⁹ Elsewhere attention has been called to a "lack of understanding as well as underrating of political work and Marxist education" in the Army Party organization.⁶⁰

This concern over ideology is more than the reflex response of the LCY leadership. The aim of these accelerated indoctrination efforts is to mobilize opinion and attitudes in support of civil institutions—i.e., the Party and government—both in the officer corps and rank and file. It reflects, in addition, a genuine concern over the cohesion of the officer corps. A major report (submitted in February 1973) to the Army Conference reviewing its activities of the past two years stressed that the main objective had been "the consolidation of consciousness and conviction of the members of the YPA concerning the essential values of self-management." The Army Party organization, "the basic cohesive force" in the YPA, must insure that Army members "raise themselves above the momentary local and partial interests of individual environments."⁶¹ Numerous examples of dissatisfaction with the pace and success of efforts in the ideological sphere exist; as a whole they suggest that the professional military is inclined to underestimate their importance.

B. Toward a National Balance in the Officer Corps

The image of the YPA as an instrument of Serb hegemony, inherently hostile and uncompromising toward Croatian interests, accounted for the deep

mistrust with which Croatian politicians viewed the YPA in 1971, and their predisposition for national or territorial armies. The incubus of a Serb-dominated military still plagues efforts to overcome national resentments in Yugoslavia. While an approximate national balance exists in the uppermost level of the military hierarchy, the officer corps as a whole is composed of a disproportionate number of Serbs.* Serbs represent 39.7 percent of the population, but comprise 60-70 percent of the officer corps (46 percent of the general officer corps). Croats, comprising 22 percent of the population, account for only 14 percent of the officer corps (19 percent of the general officer corps).**

The effort to establish a genuinely proportional representation in the officer corps, already under way in 1970, was begun again in earnest following the Croatian crisis, spurred by a new sense of urgency to transform the YPA into an all-Yugoslav organization. This is a long-term problem, but both political and military leaderships realize that a national balance in the officer corps is an essential ingredient in preserving its stability and reliability. They are aware that without it, popular apprehensions—especially in Croatia—will go unmitigated, and that whatever unifying role the military might

*Among the thirty-eight general officers occupying the top military command or staff positions, ethnic or national distribution includes twelve Serbs, eight Croats, four Slovenes, five Montenegrins, three Bosnian Muslims, three Macedonians, one Albanian, and two unknown. There are eight military districts, five congruent with republican territory, the two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, are subsumed within two Serbian military districts. The Dalmatian coast of Croatia accounts for a separate military district. The eight Territorial Defense areas are coterminous with the six republics and two provinces. The commands of the eight military districts and the eight Territorial Defense headquarters are evidently apportioned according to nationality with the obvious exception of the Croatian command held by a Serb from Croatia. See Figure 6.

**1971 figures. Zdenko Antic, "National Structure of the Yugoslav Army Leadership," RFE No. 1373, 12 April 1973; and the interview with Vladimir Bakarić in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 December 1971. Montenegrins, 2.5 percent of the population, are also overrepresented; they comprise 8 percent of the officer and 19 percent of the general officer corps.

*An example: "The organizations and forums of the League of Communists and the Communists who work in the command-administrative organs must strive for even greater successes in Marxist ideological-political advancement of all officer personnel. Further efforts in the training and preparation of the Party political cadres are of special importance . . . Op. Cit. "Report to the Conference . . ." *Narodna Armija*, 29 March 1973.

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YUGOSLAVIA *Military Districts*




Figure 5. Yugoslavia Military Districts

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FIGURE 6

**NATIONALITIES OF GENERAL OFFICERS
IN HIGHEST MILITARY COMMAND OR
STAFF POSITIONS**

Gen. Nikola Ljubicic, Federal Secretary for National Defense, Serb
Col. Gen. Milos Sumonja, Deputy Federal Secretary for National Defense, Serb
Col. Gen. Djoko Jovanic, Federal Under Secretary for National Defense, Serb (from Croatia)
Col. Gen. Dusan Korac, Inspector General, Montenegrin
Col. Gen. Dusan Pekic, Deputy Inspector General, Serb, (from Croatia)
Lt. Col. Gen. Stjepan Domankusic, Chief of Military Counterintelligence (as of 3-74), Croat

Assistant Federal Secretaries

Col. Gen. Enver Cemalovic, Air and Air Defense, Bosnian Muslim
Col. Gen. Ivan Dolnicar, Liaison with the Federal Executive Council, Slovene
Lt. Col. Gen. Dusan Vujatovic, Military Economy, Serb (?)
Adm. Branko Mamula, Naval Affairs, Croat
Lt. Col. Gen. Radomir Vojvodic, Personnel Administration, Montenegrin
Col. Gen. Dane Petkovski, Political Administration, Macedonian
Col. Gen. Petar Matic, Rear Services, Serb

General Staff

Col. Gen. Stane Potocar, Chief of the General Staff, Slovene
Col. Gen. Ilija Radakovic, Assistant Chief for Operations, Serb (from Croatia)
Lt. Col. Gen. Asim Hodzic, Assistant Chief for Intelligence, Bosnian Muslim
Col. Gen. Branislav Jokovic, Assistant Chief for Operations and Mobilization, Serb
Lt. Col. Gen. Veljko Kadijevic, Assistant Chief for Training, Croat

General Staff (Continued)

Lt. Col. Gen. Zlatko Rendulic, Assistant Chief for Materiel, Croat
Assistant Chief for Land Forces (unknown, previously Corkovic)
Maj. Gen. Dragoljub Moravcic, Assistant Chief for Supplies (?)
Maj. Gen. Ilija Mugosa, Assistant Chief for Finance and Budget, Montenegrin
Lt. Col. Gen. Dragoljub Petrovic, Chief, Frontier Guards, Montenegrin
Lt. Col. Gen. Rade Susa, Chief of Staff, Air and Air Defense Forces (?)

Military District Commanders

Col. Gen. Mirko Jovanovic, Belgrade, (I) Serb
Col. Gen. Franc Tavcar, Ljubljana, (VI) Slovene
Lt. Col. Gen. Bruno Vuletic, Nis, (II) Croat
Lt. Col. Gen. Ramija Kadenic, Sarajevo, (VII) Bosnian Muslim
Col. Gen. Vasko Karangelski, Skopje, (III) Macedonian
Adm. Ivo Purisic, Commander, Maritime District, (IV) Split, Croat
Lt. Col. Gen. Danilo Jaukovic, Titograd, (VIII) Montenegrin
Lt. Col. Gen. Dusan Corkovic, Zagreb, (V) Serb (from Croatia)

*Republican and Provincial Territorial Defense Headquarters Commanders**

Lt. Col. Gen. Mirko Vranic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croat (?)
Col. Gen. Mate Bilobrk, Croatia, Croat
Maj. Gen. Ethem Recica, Kosovo, Albanian
Col. Gen. Rajko Tanaskovic, Serbia, Serb
Col. Gen. Rudolf Hriberr¹, Slovenia, Slovene
Col. Gen. Marko Pericin, Vojvodina, Serb
Maj. Gen. Boro Causev, Macedonia, Macedonian

*Not included is the Montenegrin commander, Krsto Grozdanic, a colonel.

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play will be severely compromised.* The question is above all how to induce more Croats and Slovenes into the YPA and retain them as career officers. In the past recruitment has suffered because of wider career alternatives in these economically more advanced republics, and especially in Croatia, where the Army's image is tarnished by the preponderance of Serbs and by historical associations with Serb hegemony. These factors persist, and in an effort to compensate and raise the Croatian quota the LCC Executive Committee has urged that more efforts be made to attract candidates among workers and rural families.⁶² The poor response in related recruiting for the security services in Croatia has led to acceptance standards being considerably lowered.⁶³

To remedy the imbalance a new national defense law provides for compensatory education and accelerated promotion for non-coms, and special schooling in two-year university level military schools. Promotion policy is also weighted toward rectifying the national imbalance. The most active officer recruitment efforts have been undertaken in Slovenia,⁶⁴ still without sufficient response.⁶⁵ A military high school has been opened in Ljubljana, and as another inducement, postings in Slovenia are common policy. In the country as a whole some progress has been made. The national composition of the reserve officer corps and of the territorial defense units now virtually corresponds to the national structure of the population.⁶⁶ In addition, it was reported in June 1974 that an adequate national representation of students had been achieved in nearly all officers' schools.⁶⁷

C. Professional Grievances

Consistent with the YPA's greater political importance in recent years, a good deal of attention has been given to improving the professional status

*The 10th LCY Congress in May 1974 reiterated that "insuring as proportional as possible a staffing of the YPA headquarters and organs of the territorial defense and security" was one of the most important tasks in improving the country's defense. *Narodna Armija*, 6 June 1974. Such a policy is essential if the trust of the republics in the Army is to be achieved. Beyond this, however, and despite efforts to supplant ethnic attachments with a Yugoslav identity, proportional representation in the officer corps could in fact complicate the national question in the Army rather than eliminate it.

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and emoluments of officers. Many professionally related reforms predated the Croatian events, but were accelerated in its wake.

A series of remedial "measures to guarantee the security and stability of the military career"⁶⁸ were intended to resolve professional problems which had undermined the social and professional status of officers, and which had long been sources of discontent within the officer corps. A new law on military service and other measures now provide greater job security for officers. The most important reforms have included increased salaries and changes in the curricula of military schools to approximate civilian school training and enable a smoother transition into civilian professions for those retiring. Greater care is now given to the employment and material security of the wives and children of officers; the number of apartments allocated to military personnel has been increased; the number of transfers has been limited. A new military pension system provides, *inter alia*, that a serviceman cannot be discharged "for the needs of the service" until he reaches a "guaranteed age." The previous retirement system forced many officers and NCOs into involuntary retirement during their productive years. In June 1974 Ljubicic guaranteed that there would be no campaign to pension officers prematurely despite an acknowledged surplus. A system of early promotion has been instituted, linked in part to the effort to establish a national balance in the officer corps, and also to the goal of rejuvenating the higher levels of the officer corps. Lower age limits have been fixed for promotion to general rank, and there has been a move away from earlier promotion criteria which tended to emphasize participation in the partisan war. Ljubicic has stressed that "We are rejuvenating our forces according to age—not according to participation or non-participation in the war."⁶⁹ The title "non-commissioned officer," has been changed to "junior officer," and such individuals are now eligible for additional education and subsequent promotion through the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. These and other measures are designed to make a military career more attractive and secure, and, in Ljubicic's words, "to improve the status of the military personnel in the services of the YPA as well as their social position." They signal a new willingness to respond to long-standing professional

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grievances which undermined military morale, to eliminate sources of friction between military and civilian leaderships, and at the same time they reflect the new-found political importance and leverage of the military.

Another issue of concern to military leaders is the over-one-million Yugoslavs now employed in Western Europe as "guest workers." Approximately half are eligible for military service and they include many reserve officers. Military leaders have been active in lobbying for administrative measures which would stem the outflow and protect those already abroad against emigre subversion. In 1973 Col. Gen. Ivan Dolnicar called the phenomenon "alarming" and openly criticized Yugoslav consular and diplomatic missions as "negligent" in monitoring the activities of temporary emigres. "An absolute order and influence must be introduced," he said, "on every individual going abroad."⁷⁰ The roots of the problem are of course economic and social, and its solution long-term. Due partly to

such military concerns, however, steps were taken in 1974 to alleviate its most critical aspects. The new law on military service permits extended tours of duty in the Army on a contract basis following expiration of a conscript's regular tour. This enables the YPA to retain its trained specialists, a matter of particular concern.⁷¹ A recent inter-republic agreement was aimed at preventing the emigration of skilled workers and reserve Army officers. All individuals aged 17 to 55 (i.e., subject to military service) must obtain special permission to leave the country, must register with Yugoslav diplomatic officials abroad, and "must act according to their instructions . . . in the case of war or danger of war."⁷²

VI. LESSONS FROM THE MISKOVIC CASE

The increased level of political participation by the military evident since the Croatian crisis reflects, in its broadest significance, the relative rise in importance of the military in a setting of political uncertainty and the future possibility of political violence and civil strife. The military has been drawn into the political process because of the heightened concern over internal security and, on the whole, has abided by its prescribed role as the subordinate instrument of Party policy. Whatever disagreement has existed between civil and military authorities over the details of policy has been well-contained. In general, military leaders may have sought to make their voices heard *in camera* on military and security-related issues, but, so far as is known, have not openly challenged either the authority of political officials to make decisions or the implementation of those policies once made. In sum, during this three year period of the military's political ascent, leading military figures have not actively and systematically sought the expansion of their authority beyond the realm of what could properly be considered military and security affairs.

Such a statement, however, must not obscure the increase in the political relevance of the military, or its ability to influence the politics of crucial—and in some future scenario, possibly paramount—security decisions. The one example of an untoward expansion of military influence was the unique and short-lived rise to prominence of Col. Gen. Ivan Miskovic. The details of the Miskovic episode re-



Figure 7. Col. Gen. Ivan Dolnicar, Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense for Liaison with the Federal Executive Council (prior 1969)

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main unclear, but a reconstruction of the outlines of his twenty-month tenure as Tito's chief security advisor, and his sudden ouster, may permit some insight into the general problem of civil-military relations.

Miskovic, a Croat, was appointed in October/November 1971 Special Advisor to the President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces for Questions of Security, evidently in preparation for Tito's assault against the insubordinate elements in the Croatian leadership. In January 1972, he also assumed duties as Secretary of the State Security Council, one of the Advisory Bodies of the State Presidency. Meanwhile, Miskovic gave up the position of chief of Military Counterintelligence (*Kontraobavestajna Sluzba*, known as KOS) which he had held since May 1963, but probably retained effective authority over his successor. As KOS chief he had been instrumental in the rout of Rankovic and his minions in the security apparatus; this success and his proven loyalty to Tito eminently qualified him for the new political surgery he would oversee. In the period November 1971

through April 1973 he supervised the entire apparatus of internal security. Sitting as he did on Tito's right hand as advisor, and given the dramatic purges which were set in motion, Miskovic was—within the framework of Tito's authority—one of the two or three most powerful men in the country. In this period of domestic instability he held a position of extraordinary influence and importance.*

Of Miskovic himself we know little except that he was a man of highly conservative instincts; the exercise of his enormous influence can be associated with the gathering conservative trend during this period. In March 1973 the General assumed an unprecedented public posture. In the Army paper, *Front*, he vigorously attacked the West, alleged that the Voice of America had permitted hostile emigres to broadcast calls for demonstrations and terrorist acts in Yugoslavia, and singled out liberal dissidents Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov as traitors.**⁷³ Miskovic was predisposed to see the entire gamut of politically dangerous elements in Yugoslavia—from nationalism to neo-Communism to liberalism—as part of an elaborate conspiracy. The emphasis, however, was anti-Western and anti-liberal and his preoccupation with this orchestrated "special warfare" left little doubt that, in his view, the internal security system was the foremost line of defense in protecting against subversion.



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I agree with those who advocate the thesis that we must primarily wage an ideological and political struggle. I understand this to mean that we must fight [our internal enemies] on the ideological front with methods of ideological and political work. However, another kind of struggle, that is, a struggle involving cadre dismissals and police and court methods and means must be waged against those who have gone further, who have organized themselves, and who engage in secret, semi-public and even public hostile activities.⁷⁴

*In February 1973 it was reported that the only two advisors Tito was seeing regularly were Stane Dolanc (Secretary of the LCY Presidium) and Miskovic. Other officials normally had to go through them to see Tito, even such people as Kardelj. ()

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Figure 8. Col. Gen. Ivan Miskovic, formerly Tito's Special Advisor for Questions of Security (1972)

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Miskovic portrayed the Army by implication as the most capable instrument to pursue subversive elements, vindicated by its success in the Rankovic episode. He argued that even before pressure for decentralization had affected the State Security Service, "the Army, as a special structure and mechanism in our society, organized its [security] service in a manner which could not serve individual interests." The State Security Service, Miskovic stressed, could not—and cannot—manipulate the Army. He also made what seemed to be a plea for expanding the purview of security organs in general within the economy. He claimed that widespread distortions in the economy such as the influence of technocrats and managers and the undue accumulation of wealth by some were part of conscious subversion efforts—"counterrevolutionary aspirations," as he called them. In the interests of "economic self-defense . . . certain organs must be given the right to examine business activities and relations created in connection with them."

Such outspoken, pointed, and unusually alarmist treatment of Yugoslavia's security concerns raised the question of professional impropriety, and in retrospect it seems clear that Miskovic overreached his mandate as the country's chief security officer. It should be pointed out that Miskovic made no observable departures from the Tito line but chose to associate himself with the more conservative interpretation still permitted by that centrist position. In April 1972, for example, Miskovic publicly condemned the purged Croatian leaders as factionalists, but warned of the resurgence of neo-Stalinism "which maintains a hostile and alien attitude toward our self-managing socialism," a measured attack against both right and left.⁷⁶ His public posture was, however, at variance with his private views and activities which served to rally or spur conservative sympathies.

This was confirmed when, in May 1973, Miskovic reputedly met with a group of retired military officers in Osijek, Croatia, urged them to be more active in party affairs, and in effect, indicated that they should attempt to take control of the party from civilians; the general defended orthodox Communism (i.e., presumably opposing liberal aspects of the Yugoslav variant), took a strong

anti-Western line, and accused the U.S. of organizing and supporting emigre subversion.⁷⁶ Miskovic had a ready constituency in Osijek, the site of strongly conservative and rebellious activities by veterans' organizations. On about 12 July, shortly after his ouster, the Executive Committee of the Croatian Party announced that it was investigating a group of retired military officers who had been working against the Party line,⁷⁷ probably the same elements.

Miskovic's demise was more sudden than his elevation. In April 1973 he was removed as Tito's special advisor on security affairs. On the proposal of Tito the Yugoslav Presidency passed an order establishing another office—Advisor to the Presidency for Affairs Concerning State Security—and appointed Miskovic to the post, a step which altered his status as Tito's personal advisor and eliminated his direct access and his monopoly role in security affairs. On 19 June "Red Tanjug" (a news service reserved for Party and State officials) published a Reuters report that the General had given up his newly acquired post due to illness. At the same time the Executive Bureau of the LCY Presidium, including Tito, met in an extraordinary session with, inter alia, all Presidents of the republican and provincial central committees, the prime minister, the secretary of the Party committee in the Army, and the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs. The session discussed "some topical problems on the work of the state security organs in the struggle against foreign and domestic enemies,"⁷⁸ and no doubt sealed Miskovic's fate.

Coincident with the development of Miskovic's position as near-exclusive counselor to Tito, a pattern of increased Army influence was noted in the formulation and management of the country's foreign affairs. With the close collaboration of other key military figures and agencies, the Army reportedly assumed practical control of the intelligence functions of the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs by placing members of the Second Bureau of the General Staff (Administration II, Military Intelligence) in the Secretariat. This was an effort, reportedly, not to control the entire Secretariat as such but to exercise influence over

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foreign policy through the control of intelligence.* In addition, plans were said to exist to place retired generals in ambassadorships after a *pro forma* internship in the Secretariat. This rather elaborate effort, if true, would have been cut short by Miskovic's ouster.

A number of other events tend to support the general argument that an effort was under way, the purpose of which was the aggrandizement of military authority in areas of responsibility which fell clearly within civilian jurisdiction. Military Counterintelligence (KOS) was believed to have been involved in the release of Foreign Secretary Mirko Tepavac in October 1972. One of the reasons given for his release was failure to provide Tito and the Cabinet with all the information available to the Secretariat—an allegation which would have served as a convenient pretext for the staffing policies noted above. Furthermore, following Tepavac's dismissal, Minister of Defense Ljubicic attacked the Foreign Affairs Secretariat (at a Party Conference in Belgrade, 6-7 December 1972), charging that it had not been doing its job and accusing individuals of malfeasance (including smuggling and dereliction of duty).⁷⁰

Despite the reported role of the KOS in the Tepavac release there are no indications of collusion between Miskovic and other leading military figures, nor of his direct participation in the activities in the Foreign Affairs Secretariat. Furthermore, while rumor abounded that Miskovic had plotted a political takeover upon Tito's death (and his name was linked with other generals) there is little evidence to support this. In any case, Miskovic's conspiracy would have had to have been in its incipience; had he successfully enlisted others his own purge logically would have been followed by the ouster of complicitous colleagues, and pos-

*Interestingly, Miskovic's own manipulation of information to Tito accounted for at least one reason for his ouster. The General had reportedly presented Tito with tendentious interpretations of security-related developments, and had carefully excluded Tito's access to alternative intelligence views. [REDACTED] June 1973, CONFIDENTIAL. This account was later confirmed by Vladimir Bakaric who said Tito had told him that Miskovic had given him "misinformation" concerning the intentions of the US and USSR. [REDACTED] 17 July 1973, SECRET/NFD/CD/NDA/BUO.

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sibly wider purges in the KOS, erroneously assumed to be Miskovic's personal constituency and his institutional base of support.

Miskovic's ambitions remain a matter of speculation—less so a probable cause of his demise. So much authority in internal security had come to be vested in his person during the course of the Party purges and consolidation campaign that the only way to restore the balance was to be rid of the man. There is evidence, in fact, that precisely because of the nature and degree of his authority he had become the focus of misgivings by other military leaders. [REDACTED] his removal occurred after a large group of general officers addressed a letter to Tito protesting Miskovic's actions, *inter alia*, in projecting Western intelligence involvement with hostile Yugoslav emigres.⁸⁰ The concentration of his authority was the result of existing domestic turmoil and was countenanced by Tito because of this. It seems apparent that Miskovic exercised his enormous authority in security affairs in accord with his conservative leanings, and it is more than plausible that he tried to use it to serve his own political ambitions. But the relative ease with which he was ousted, and the evident absence of personnel repercussions in the wake of his departure, suggest a) that there was no conspiracy and b) that in any case he lacked a base of institutional support. This strongly suggests, in addition, that Miskovic in his relationship with Tito neither represented the Army nor any constituency in it (in the sense of having any institutional linkage), and that his predispositions were not necessarily representative of those in the military establishment.*

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On the other hand, whatever specifics account for the Miskovic dismissal, there is enough peripheral evidence that his summary elimination was part of a more general effort to emphasize anew the subordination of the military and, to attenuate the

*It is interesting to note that as a precaution a policy of rotating the command of KOS has apparently been initiated to preclude the possibility that this all-important security organ develop an autonomous political importance under the control of one man. Miskovic held the position for 7½ years, whereas his successor, Stjepan Domankusic, according to a recent report, was replaced in October 1974 following a normal three year tour. [REDACTED]

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prominence of a number of military leaders who had overstepped their proper responsibilities at least in their public utterances. The reorganization of the Security Advisor position was meant to prohibit the kind of monopoly Miskovic had fashioned and the distortions it had evidently made possible. In addition, in early June (1973) the State Presidency proposed (but evidently never established) a nine-member "committee to control the armed forces" representing six republics and two provinces and including Tito. The move was reportedly the result of "intolerable" influence of military figures over the Executive Council.⁸¹ Other reports of that period (April-June 1973) noted that the responsibilities of such leading generals as Ljubicic and Dolnicar had been pared to conform to purely military functions. But despite an apparent temporary eclipse they reemerged without a noticeable deterioration in stature or position.⁸² Finally, in the wake of the Miskovic affair an article in the Party Presidium's authoritative theoretical journal *Socijalizam*⁸³ stressed the subordination of military to political authority in a discussion of the SFRY Presidency's role as contained in the draft of the new constitution, restating the superiority of civilian organs both in principle and practice.

The developments described above are instances of military assertiveness which the Party leadership with Tito's approval sought to curtail in the spring of 1973. It was clearly a case of putting these military leaders in their place by way of reprimand, and did not warrant dismissals that more serious infractions of the proper lines of military authority would have. The most serious violations were Miskovic's and his ouster was a reminder that Tito would brook no challenge. His removal marked the end of a phase in Party-military relations during which, as a result of Tito's reliance on the military and its importance in buttressing Party consolidation efforts, it gained inordinate political influence and expanded political involvement.

If the period contains a lesson for the future it is as an example of the growth of a pattern of political involvement and influence by military leaders during a period of political realignment and uncertainty. It also points to the difficulty of relying upon and simultaneously controlling the military. In the Miskovic case an active military figure had virtually exclusive access to Tito on questions of

security affairs, and as subsequent events showed, interpreted this mandate broadly. Furthermore, insofar as Tito was setting policy on such matters as political stabilization, purges, and Party reorganization, a representative (but not an emissary) of the military had an extraordinary degree of influence on him, more, perhaps, than the usual civilian political channels. Finally, both the disturbed political situation and Miskovic's authority provided a setting (or the latitude for) the expansion of the political activity of other military leaders, but it is doubtful that they were in league with each other. The ultimate check on the political engagement of the military was Tito's personal authority. He used it judiciously to discourage YPA political activity which might call the Party's ultimate authority and role into question, but he did nothing which would undermine the Army's role as an essential pillar of the Yugoslav system. The reappearance of this pattern of military involvement in the future should surprise no one. Moreover, in the absence of Tito's prevailing authority the military—either as an institution or individuals—will be in a much more fluid political position vis-a-vis Party/state authority. The Marshal's political impregnability is not something he can bequeath his successors.

VII. MILITARY DOMINATION OF CIVILIAN SECURITY ORGANS

In the wake of the Croatian crisis, and with further political consolidation in prospect, a shaken Party leadership fixed its attention on insuring a stronger and more effective security system. Both in Croatia and Serbia the security services had shown themselves sympathetic to positions adopted by republican leaderships in opposition to federal authority. The result was a further increase in the responsibility of military intelligence, and a subsequent call by Tito for an integral, centralized security service. "It is absolutely essential," he told representatives of the State Security Service in May 1974, "for the security services to be linked up; the enemy is united against us so our security service must be united against him too."⁸⁴ New legislation (promulgated on 11 January 1974) stresses the "indivisibility" of security functions, and with this as touchstone prescribes the obligations of all agencies within the security apparatus.⁸⁵ The past

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few years have witnessed the expansion, consolidation, and centralization of the security services.

There are three Yugoslav security services, which are functionally separate, but today in practice approximate a more integral organization. The Public Security Service (*Sluzba Javne Bezbednosti* or SJB) comprises the uniformed police departments and is directly subordinate to the Secretariat of Internal Affairs on the federal, republic/provincial, and communal levels. The State Security Service (*Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti* or SDB) is the security arm of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs on each descending level. Finally, Military Counterintelligence (*Kontraobavestajna Sluzba* or KOS) is subordinated to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. Republican security agencies are now subordinated to the central, federal level, and function through a direct chain of command. The state security (SDB) has a single chain of command up to the federal level, despite the fact that outwardly its organization fits the usual Yugoslav federal subdivision. Official policy treats the republic agencies as departments of the federal agency, and while the former are accountable for their activities to the respective republican department of the federal agency, they are actually directly subordinate to the Director of State Security, the federal body.⁸⁶ Most important, the two civilian services are now effectively dominated by their military counterpart.

In fact it was Miskovic who as Tito's security advisor really engineered the renaissance of the internal security services under military auspices. As earlier indicated, he was predisposed to cast Yugoslavia's maladies in terms of a grand conspiracy and to portray the Army as the most capable instrument to pursue subversive elements, in view of its exemplary success in the Rankovic conspiracy. His demise did little to alter the trend toward the integrated and centralized security system which he championed. This has been accomplished at the expense of republican autonomy—indeed, was intended in part to oversee the reduction of that autonomy. In addition, there is much evidence to suggest that, in the elaboration of a more extensive and unified security system, Military Counterintelligence plays the paramount role. One recent report, for example, discloses that security personnel—particularly from KOS—have been placed in republican

Presidencies and League of Communist Executive Committees (i.e., the highest Republican state and Party bodies) to provide closer coordination between the defense establishment (particularly military intelligence organs, but including State Security) and the republics. The impetus for this direct involvement of federal security officials at the highest levels of republican government and Party life is said to have come from the Federal Secretariat of National Defense, with Tito and Defense Minister Ljubicic having made the final decision.⁸⁷ Another example of the preeminence of military intelligence vis-a-vis its civilian counterparts was KOS responsibility for the Spring 1974 investigations of Cominformists, purportedly because of the ineffectiveness of the SDB in coping with the problem from the beginning. Tito was said to have been particularly irritated with the SDB as a result.⁸⁸

The military's mandate for domestic and/or civilian security activities derives from the following factors:

(1) *By virtue of the fact that the military as a whole serves as an important target for subversive efforts*—a theme that appears again and again in both military and political media—the *de facto* jurisdiction of KOS extends well beyond military ranks. The civilian Security Services cannot undertake any action which could be interpreted as having military relevance without first obtaining its approval. Military intelligence is also active in Yugoslav foreign affairs institutions, especially the foreign ministry and the embassies. Since a main preoccupation of foreign intelligence efforts is the activities of hostile emigre groups, foreign responsibilities of KOS have quite logically been made to conform to its expanded domestic responsibilities. The Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs cooperates formally through liaison sections with 1) the Federal Service of State Security (SDB) and 2) the security service of the YPA (KOS). The latter reigns supreme, however, through a system of appointments which assigns security officers key positions in embassies and consulates, so that in effect military intelligence maintains *de facto* control of security and intelligence activities abroad.⁸⁹ According to one report, General Franjo Herljevic was chosen as the new

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Federal Minister of Internal Affairs in May 1974 to effect closer coordination between military and civilian security services, and to supervise the organizational changes this would require. His mandate, moreover, was said to include replacing substantial numbers of federal SDB personnel, particularly those with foreign responsibilities.⁹⁰ By appointing KOS officers that organization is now reported to be in complete control of the SDB.⁹¹

(2) The prescribed targets of the police and the SDB are civilian, whereas those of the KOS are military, its basic task that of policing the Army. However, *the system of All Peoples' Defense has provided the rationale for interpreting a wide range of nominally civilian offenses (notably, in connection with emigre-related activities) as military targets.* Since these have a higher priority, military intelligence can require the most extensive assistance from the SDB, can obtain access to SDB files, and has the authority to assume complete control over a case if it prefers. This leads in practice to a good deal of overlap, but whenever necessary, simultaneous operations may be separated, with military intelligence usually deciding who will continue to work on a specific target.⁹² Military Counterintelligence has reportedly placed its own men in key positions in the organizations of All Peoples' Defense.⁹³ Despite the existence of formal liaison channels between military intelligence and the SDB at the republic or Military District levels, actual joint action is rare and occurs, as a rule, when military needs dictate it.⁹⁴ There are few issues which do not have a military relevance or cannot be construed as such, thus providing KOS wider prerogatives.

(3) *As a result of the discovery of the Rankovic conspiracy by KOS, its role in his ouster, and its success in preventing the penetration of the Army by the conspiracy, the responsibilities of Military Counterintelligence for internal security were greatly expanded.* The ouster of Rankovic both decimated and discredited the state security apparatus; some 20,000 individuals were expelled from its ranks after 1966.⁹⁵ KOS was vindicated once again, and its authority further enhanced, by the in-

adequate response of the Croatian and Serbian security services during the 1971 and 1972 political crises. The Rankovic episode demonstrated the importance of the Army in any political struggle or bid for power, and the importance of its loyalty to the ruling group. The KOS therefore becomes an extremely important factor in insuring this loyalty; it is in a sense, the kingpin of the Army's political role, and this would be so especially in circumstances where a military putsch might be planned. To insure the success of a coup—military or civilian—KOS would have to be either aligned with the putschists, controlled by them, or neutralized. This is a lesson which also emerges from Rankovic's gambit. In less dramatic scenarios, KOS is an essential factor in controlling military factionalism.

(4) The most visible aspect of the military's central role in the system of internal security is *the May 1974 appointment of two Army generals to the two key federal internal security posts:* Col. General Franjo Herljevic, a Croat (reliably reported a man of the strictest conservative attitudes) replaced Yugoslavia's civilian Minister of Internal Affairs, and Maj. General Vuko Gozze-Gucetic, also a Croat, occupied the Public Prosecutorship, the highest civilian judicial office. As noted above, both organizations were badly shaken, especially at the republican level, by the disintegrative pressures associated with the political disruptions of 1971-1972. The appointments are an unprecedented (and somewhat paradoxical) effort to strengthen these key civilian offices by placing them in the hands of military officers. Whatever the coincident risk of increased military influence may be, the appointments tacitly acknowledge the unacceptable liability and weaknesses of civilian control at the present time. They serve as one of the most telling illustrations of Tito's conviction that the Army, because of its disposition, loyalties, and institutional strengths, is better equipped to insure continuity and guarantee stability. Furthermore, the appointments reflect a desire to insulate these agencies and remove them from political pressures, insofar as this is possible. The changes therefore encourage the coor-

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dination of military and state security activities at every level, and are a means, as we have seen above, of overseeing the republican security services. In short, they consolidate an invigorated security service via the military. Both Tito and the Party/state leadership can be more sanguine about the security services since their autonomy is circumscribed by their effective subordination to the military. There do not now exist two separate realms of authority over security affairs.*

Also relevant to the question of the military's central role in internal security is the reported transfer of General Djoko Jovanic (commander of the Zagreb Military District) to the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (FSND) as an Assistant Secretary. According to this report, he has been assigned control of those activities of the Federal Secretariat for *Internal Affairs* which pertain to the State Security Service, as well as responsibility for four separate administrations of the FSND—security-counterintelligence, political, personnel, and border forces. Notwithstanding the bureaucratic anomaly of an Assistant Secretary of Defense controlling the State Security Service (which falls

*National defense affairs as such have been recently (October 1974) placed under the jurisdiction of the Council for National Defense of the State Presidency. Under Tito's chairmanship the Council is composed *ex officio* of all eight members of the Collective State Presidency, the eight presidents of the presidencies of the republics and autonomous provinces, the Federal Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Internal Affairs, the President of the Federal Assembly, the Chairman of the Federal Executive Council, and the Chief of the YPA General Staff. In addition, the state Presidency has elected nine leading officials—five of them generals—as members of the Council. (*Sluzbeni List SFRJ*, 11 October 1974). The law on the Council for National Defense replaced a similar statute (*Sluzbeni List SFRJ*, 8 February 1973) which set forth the Council's responsibilities more explicitly. The general formulations of the recent law indicate a more comprehensive mandate. In designating republican presidents as Council members it seeks to guarantee consensus in any major defense policy decisions. Unlike its earlier counterpart it is empowered to request information from any governmental or economic organization, thus bypassing other federal or republican agencies.

Since the Council for National Defense is reported to coordinate all SDB operations, this provides the country's most powerful military officials with another means of exerting influence over the SDB. ([REDACTED])
20 June 1974, SECRET/NFD/CD) 25X1A2g




Figure 9. Col. Gen. Franjo Herljevic, Federal Minister of Internal Affairs (Jun 74)

under the formal authority of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs), it is a further indication of the consolidation of a revitalized State Security Service under military auspices. Another important indication of military control over security is the reputed existence of a coordinating body for all intelligence matters consisting of Jovanic, Lt. Col. Gen. Dane Cuic, the chief of KOS (who reportedly replaced Gen. Stjepan Domankusic in September/October 1974), Domankusic himself, now reported to be commander of the border forces, and Franjo Herljevic. This coordinating body is responsible directly to Ljubicic and Tito.⁹⁶

In recent months the security services as a whole have been given a public image which contrasts with their low profile and public disgrace following Rankovic's fall,⁹⁷ which in itself reflects the leadership's new confidence in them. The new respectability is designed in part to facilitate creation of a network of voluntary internal espionage. Based on the notion of "social self-defense," a tandem concept of All Peoples' Defense, the January 1974 law provided framework legislation for a revised

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Yugoslav Military Forces (I) Yugoslav Military Forces (I)



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Approved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000600170003-6

Yugoslav Military Forces (II)

Yugoslav Military Forces (II)

CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF

CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY REGIONS
I BELGRADE
II NIS
III SKOPJE
IV ZAGREB
V LJUBLJANA
VI SARAJEVO

IV MARITIME DISTRICT
BETET

TITOGRAD
INDEPENDENT
SUB-REGION

AIR AND AIR
DEFENSE FORCES

TITOGRAD
INDEPENDENT
SUB-REGION

AIR AND AIR
DEFENSE FORCES

DIRECTOR, TERRITORIAL
AND CIVIL DEFENSE

FRONTIER
GUARD

TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
UNITS

CIVILIAN DEFENSE
UNITS

Cooperation and support

TE
SL
CR
BO
MG
MA
SE
VO
KO

TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
UNITS

CIVILIAN DEFENSE
UNITS

TERRITORIAL DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS

REPUBLICS
CROATIA
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
MONTENEGRO
MACEDONIA
SERBIA
VOJVODINA
KOSOVO

OPSTINA (COMMUNAL)
AND MUNICIPAL DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

security system intended to penetrate all basic social and economic administrative organizations. It established obligatory patterns of cooperation and coordination between them and the security services.⁹⁸ As of March it had yet to find the necessary implementation in communal or Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (workers' councils) statutes.⁹⁹ Furthermore, while "social self-defense" has been purveyed as a "self-managing" security system involving widespread popular participation, its protagonists at all levels have been by and large from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹⁰⁰ In fact, thus far the effect of the new law, and of "social self-defense" has been to restore the powers of the extant security apparatus.¹⁰¹

Finally, one important qualification should be noted. Although the role of the military in the domestic security system has been greatly enhanced, it is by no means an exclusive one. The LCY has also sought to monitor the security apparatus through Party organs. As in its approach to the YPA, the Party leadership has emphasized the need to curtail the institutional separateness of the security service with a view toward eliminating any scope for autonomous action.* To this end, the Party appears to be striving to secure increased supervision by central LCY organs over cadre placement within security organs, emphasizing political loyalty as "the basic criteria of the cadre consolidation of these organs."

VIII. THE INTERNAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY REDEFINED

What role is the Yugoslav Army to have in the political succession and in the immediate post-Tito period? Senior Yugoslav officials have acknowledged the primary importance of the nation's military in any change of leadership, and such views reflect the reality of the Army's new political salience.¹⁰²

The negative experience [of Rankovic] warns us against tendencies according to which the security organization is inadequately linked to the Party, tendencies in which the security organization would no longer serve the revolutionary movement and the League of Communists, but rather the struggle for power for managing people and their democratic institutions." Speech by Mitja Ribicic, Vice President of Presidency of SFRY, Belgrade Domestic Service, 15 May 1974.

Since September 1970, efforts have been under way to fashion a collective leadership which would anticipate and replace Tito's personal leadership. In June 1971, on the basis of the 36th Amendment of the Yugoslav constitution, a 23-member State Presidency came into being (three representatives from each of the six republics, two each from the two autonomous provinces and Tito) whose governing role was essentially mediatory. The arrangement proved unwieldy and easy prey to obstructionist tactics. Growing republican assertiveness, disintegrating federal authority, and the political turmoil of 1971-1972 were the stimuli for a new constitution designed to reestablish federal authority in key areas, among them defense. In the new Yugoslav constitution promulgated in February 1974, the State Presidency was reduced to nine members, one from each republic and province, plus Tito. Less an amalgam of republican interests, its authority and powers in specifically defined areas of federal competence are now more inherent than delegated.

The expanded presence of military officials in Party and state executive organs during 1974 is the most visible sign of the enhanced political role of the military, reflecting both the growth in military influence and the conscious premise that the military institution imparts a measure of its own stability and strength to governmental institutions and processes. The May 1974 LCY Party congress replaced the two hundred and eighty-member LCY Conference with a one hundred and sixty-six-member Central Committee, the latter composed of twenty representatives from each of the six republican Party organizations, fifteen each from the two provincial Parties and the YPA Party organization. An active duty general, Ivan Kukoc (a Croat), was named to the twelve-member Executive Committee (which replaced the eight-member Executive Bureau), the LCY's highest executive body. Two generals, the Defense Minister Nikola Ljubicic (a Serb) and Secretary of the Army Party organization, Dzemil Sarac, retained their positions on the thirty-nine member LCY Presidium, the latter in a newly established *ex officio* capacity.* The Presidium is composed of five members from each republican Party, three from the provinces, and,

*In February 1975, six members of the Executive Committee previously not included in the Presidium were added to it, along with an additional three to insure that parity among the nationalities be maintained.

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as noted, two from the Army. In addition to their fifteen allocated seats on the LCY Central Committee, five additional Army representatives have been included in the republican delegations, thus bringing the number of Army representatives in the Central Committee to twenty, or twelve percent of the total. At the Ninth Congress (1969) only two Army representatives were members of the LCY Conference (i.e., Central Committee). At the Eighth Congress (1964) ten military delegates sat on a one hundred and fifty-five-member Central Committee, comprising six percent of the total.

Furthermore, an important procedural change pointed to a greater degree of YPA autonomy in the selection process. The authority to name delegates previously resided with the Electoral Commission of the LCY Congress. In the recent case, the YPA Party organization independently, and apparently without prior approval, selected delegates to the Congress and appointed the fifteen officers who serve as Central Committee delegates.¹⁰³ Thus the Army has assumed a status within the Party formally somewhat akin to that of a province. Military positions on the Central Committee group together the most important military leaders and

integrate them in an unprecedented way in Central Committee policymaking, thus enhancing their motive to identify with the established political process. At a minimum, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for political administration, the Chief of Staff, and the Commander of the most important Army Districts—Belgrade (First), Zagreb (Fifth), Ljubljana (Sixth), and the Maritime (Fourth)—seem, by virtue of their positions, to have been assured places on the Central Committee. The Secretary of the Army Party organization, as noted above, has specifically been designated as a Central Committee member *ex officio*. The emplacement of two generals in the most important internal security posts in the federal government is a further departure from precedent.

The constitutional control of the military has been altered to favor its more efficient and timely use. Procedures for activating the YPA have been centralized and the number of participants involved in the decision and implementation process reduced. The ambiguity surrounding the delimiting of republican and federal authority in defense and military matters has been eliminated; the State Presidency now directs and commands the Yugoslav armed forces in peace and war. Moreover, the command of the armed forces, previously to have been assigned to a Military Committee (composed of the Defense Minister and two nominees of the State Presidency), can now be delegated to the Defense Minister alone, thus strengthening his personal role and authority, removing opportunity or latitude for delay, and rendering less complicated the procedures for the activation of the Army, either for internal or external purposes.* Justifying what in prac-

*The new constitution regulates internal military activity in this way: "The Presidency of the SFRY shall draw up a plan on how to use the armed forces of the SFRY in event of war and shall order the use of the armed forces in peacetime." (Article 316, Section 2—a passage, incidentally, that was not included in the constitution's earlier draft text.) In reference to the Minister of Defense, Section 3 of Article 316 significantly omits a passage [in brackets below] which was a part of the draft: "The Presidency of the SFRY may transfer certain matters pertaining to the leading and commanding of the SFRY armed forces to the Federal Secretary of National Defense [as determined by federal law]. The Federal Secretary of National Defense is responsible to the SFRY Presidency for matters transferred to him." Elimination of the bracketed phrase enables the more flexible use of the armed forces and concentrates the authority for this use, avoiding exposure to the legislative process.



Figure 12. Col. Gen. Ivan Kukoc, Member of the LCY Executive Committee (Jun 74)

League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Communists of Yugoslavia

CONGRESS

CONGRESS

(must be held at least every five years)

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

(165 delegates)

PRESIDENT

PRESIDIUM (48)

PRESIDIUM (48)

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (12)

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

OTHER COMMISSIONS

OTHER COMMISSIONS

STATUTORY COMMISSION

REPUBLICAN (6)
AND PROVINCIAL (2)
CONGRESSES

CONFERENCE OF THE LCY
ORGANIZATION IN THE YPA

CENTRAL COMMITTEES

PRESIDENT

PRESIDIUM

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SECRETARIAT

COMMITTEE

SECRETARY

SECRETARY

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

STATUTORY COMMISSION

OPSTINA
AND CITY COMMITTEES

FRONTIER GUARDS

AIR AND AIR DEFENSE
CONFERENCE

MILITARY DISTRICT
CONFERENCES

SECRETARY

SECRETARY

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Federal Government of Yugoslavia

CHAMBER OF REPUBLICS
AND PROVINCES

FEDERAL CHAMBER

SOCIAL
ACCOUNTING
SERVICE

PUBLIC
DEFENDER

PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR

COUNCIL OF
THE FEDERATION

PRESIDENT
OF THE
REPUBLIC

COUNCIL FOR
NATIONAL DEFENSE

SUPREME
MILITARY
COURT

FEDERAL
COURT

SUPREME
COURT

FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

COORDINATING COMMISSION
OF THE FEC

FEDERAL
LEGAL COUNCIL

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL
ECONOMIC COUNCIL

FINANCE

FOREIGN TRADE

JUSTICE AND
GENERAL
ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL
DEFENSE

TRANSPORTATION
AND
COMMUNICATIONS

AND

SCIENCE
AND CULTURE

INFORMATION

HEALTH AND
SOCIAL CARE

ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
WITH DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

VETERANS
AND MILITARY
DISABILITY AFFAIRS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

MARKETS
AND PRICES

SOCIAL
PLANNING

SOCIAL
PLANNING

LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT

TOURISM

ENERGY AND
INDUSTRY

AGRICULTURE

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tice will be broad grants of authority to the Defense Minister, the Party Presidium's authoritative organ, *Socijalizam* (June 1973) explained, "... These are matters involving executive commands and require fast and effective reaction and decision-making in all situations and, in particular, personal responsibility of the person performing that type of function before the State Presidency." The fact that the same Constitutional provision stipulates that delegates of the State Presidency may be assigned to the Defense Ministry and to other high YPA commands to control their work is testimony to the expansion of military authority and to the direct relationship which is foreseen.

If the increased political participation of the military is apparent, the actual exercise of its political influence, and the ambitions of individual military figures are less clear. On the whole, as suggested earlier, the new prominence of the military is not the result of its own systematic political aggrandizement. It has willingly followed a civilian lead, however, stressing both its rights and obligations as a mainstay of the country's political stability. At the same time it has exhibited a keen sense of restraint and respect for established institutions, processes and political norms, in that it has made no effort to challenge, alter them, or operate apart from them.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the legitimacy of political institutions in Yugoslavia derives in large measure from a highly personalist, and therefore transcendent, sense of loyalty to Tito. To what extent Party and state institutions might command or elicit this loyalty once deprived of the politically binding force to Tito's charisma is uncertain. It is certain that throughout the turmoil of purge, reorganization and change of course in recent years Tito's personal imprimatur has served as an essential ingredient insuring the legitimacy of these efforts. The deference which the military has shown for political and civil institutions during this period therefore flows at least in part from Tito's presence. Tito's departure, probably immediately, but surely in the longer-term, will therefore alter the rules of the game concerning military participation. The question is to what extent existing civil institutions and processes and ideological concepts will govern military behavior once Tito has passed from the scene. While Tito lives, or

while his authority persists, and barring some cataclysm, the military could probably only challenge extant institutions (i.e., by taking power) in the name of preserving them.

It will be recalled that after the Croatian crisis (especially between January and June 1972) it became a fixture in the public statements of military leaders that domestic stability was the *sine qua non* of a successful defense policy against foreign aggression, and the precondition for the successful implementation of All Peoples' Defense. The thesis was self-evident; what distinguished it was the military's open insistence, a reminder of its concern over continuing political uncertainty. The October 1972 "Tito Letter" which demanded an end to the desultory and disorganized pace of consolidation within the Party and the economy was greeted by the military with uncommon enthusiasm, accompanied by simultaneous denials of any independent interest in it apart from accelerating efforts to restore the vigorous leading role of the Party. Said one Army spokesman: "Under the leadership of the League of Communists and Comrade Tito, just as was the case in the past whenever mass revolutionary actions were undertaken, the YPA cooperates as a true social force." The Army depicted itself as "cooperating" in the political realm not through "its status as an armed force, but primarily through its sociopolitical activity and the behavior of Communists and members of the Army in its own circle and in sociopolitical communities and organizations on the line of the League of Communists." The Army thus professed not to wish to engage in "some kind of interference in internal life." But it did insist upon its right of participation in the discussion and resolution of major social and political questions as entirely appropriate.*¹⁰⁴ Military participation in sociopolitical matters has in fact since become more determined and systematic. The Political Department of the Defense Min-

*CF, e.g., Editorial, "Preparations for the 10th LCY Congress: The Tasks of the Army," *Narodna Armija*, 8 February 1973, "... during the pre-congress period the

Communists in the Army will be involved in all current affairs of the society: in the struggle for a consistent implementation of the constitutional amendments, for economic stabilization and for savings on all fronts, in the activities connected with the elections for assemblies and in preparations for some 10 congresses in provinces, republics, and the federation."

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istry has explicitly urged all officers to seek election to SAWPY organizations where they reside or work. (SAWPY, the LCY's National Front Organization, plays a key role in cadre selection for and management of the country's governmental structure.)

While the Army has made no secret of its preference for the more conservative political course launched by the Party, at no time did it adopt a public posture which might have been interpreted as challenging or casting doubt on its subordinate status. Its own declaratory position argues that the YPA is not "a classical military organization and . . . an element of the state structure with its own independent interests which lead it to independent actions in political life. . . ." ¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Army spokesmen have protested charges that the military was the motive force behind prevailing conservative trends in Yugoslavia, "a retrogressive force which pulls toward administrative and centralist methods of government." ¹⁰⁶ Doubters have been assured that the YPA "does not have and cannot have any ambitions but to develop and guard the self-managing society." ¹⁰⁷

Such disclaimers reflect, nevertheless, an undercurrent of concern over the Army's expanded importance and its future role. In May 1973 a leading military official claimed that "rumors were being systematically disseminated" in an effort to compromise the YPA and its public image. These labelled the Army as "backward, bureaucratic, and anti-self-managing," and warned that "in the coming period the Army and the police will play a decisive role and that 'democratic forces must think and ask themselves what will happen if the Army comes to power.'" ¹⁰⁸ Such sentiments and misgivings are probably harbored by many in Yugoslavia who fear that should the Army reach a position where its influence on policy was decisive it might eventually compromise many of the established fundamentals of the Yugoslav system. In a period of protracted political uncertainty or instability, for example, a genuine commitment to a liberal interpretation of "self-management" might appear a political luxury and is bound to be undermined. The line of least resistance would be to adopt more centralized control and discipline, and in keeping with their predilections, Army leaders could be expected to urge such a course.

Perhaps the most authoritative formulation of the military's internal role to emerge since the Croatian events was an article in the LCY Presidium's theoretical journal *Socijalizam*. ¹⁰⁹ Its appearance—at a time when Miskovic was at the apex of his power and military influence was felt in the foreign ministry—suggested the existence of a *sub rosa* debate on the new prominence of the military, or at the least, some uncertainty in defining the YPA's role and place under present circumstances. *Socijalizam* argued that it was perfectly normal and consistent with "Marxist science" that during the transition from a class to a classless society the armed forces had both an internal and an external function. The former "amounts to the defense of the existing social order, that is, to an intervention or a potential possibility for intervention with the purpose of maintaining the power of the ruling class." In Yugoslavia, however, the progressive reduction of class and social contradictions meant that the need for any internal intervention was increasingly disappearing and "the external function of the armed forces is becoming predominant." The Army must remain prepared to "defend the constitutional system" but, a pointed caveat, "this does not imply that the internal function is the primary function." This appeared an effort both to rationalize and yet depreciate the military's domestic role, to return it to its proper and less prominent place in the wake of the unsettled political circumstances of 1972 which had been the basis for its elevation, and to redirect the attention of the military to the sphere of external defense and All Peoples' Defense.

Its military role aside, the Army remains a source of conservative pressure.* Dissatisfaction from

*Lest the "conservative" label be misunderstood in characterizing the military, it is meant to connote an essentially loyalist position tending toward the preservation of existing institutions and Party-defined policies. The military evidently shares the fundamental premises which underlie the formulation of Party policy—federalism, self-management, distance from the USSR, etc. (This commitment to self-management, however, would not extend to the YPA itself.) At the same time, the military would prefer increased reliance on administrative and centralist methods of control. The Army therefore favors vastly strengthened discretionary authority for Party bodies vis-a-vis the population at large—but again, an important qualification, not vis-a-vis the Army itself. In sum, the differences between the attitude of most military leaders and that of many civilian LCY officials tend to arise over questions of degree rather than of fundamental principle.

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within the Army continued to be expressed over what was regarded as unsatisfactory progress in implementing political consolidation and eliminating economic distortions as outlined in the "Tito Letter." For example, a November 1973 editorial in *Narodna Armija* bluntly noted the "obligation of the LCY to continue constantly to examine and reexamine everything achieved and to adopt a self-critical attitude toward itself and the results of its work. This obligation also implies a resolute ideological confrontation and an increasingly quicker settling of accounts with the enemies of our self-managing orientation, because they undermine . . . the defense capability of the country."¹¹⁰ More recently, Defense Minister Ljubicic acknowledged an impatience among Army personnel with what they viewed as an irresolute pace in dealing with political and economic shortcomings. "Our people often do not know why they are not solved more quickly," said Ljubicic, adding that "we sometimes react emotionally" because we do not understand how deeply rooted in our social reality many deformations are and "it is not easy to cut them off."¹¹¹ More preemptory methods were presumably to be preferred.

Thus, the equating of domestic consolidation with the country's defense capacity has served as the platform from which the Army has prodded and criticized the Party. Similarly, the rationale for urging the active involvement of Army personnel in extra-military affairs is that "the penetration of technocratism and liberalism, the activity of nationalists and of bureaucratic and other anti-self-management forces, the underestimating of the League of Communists' role in society, the alienation of a considerable part of surplus value from the working class [are] directed against the defense efforts of our society as a whole. . . . The LC requires of Communists and other members of the YPA that they be active in political life. . . . Of course the work of Communists and other Army personnel must always be based on LCY policy."¹¹² The military, in short, has the right and obligation to voice its views and assert its influence in areas which lie outside its formal responsibilities.

Such criticisms and the strong corporate support which the military has given to Tito's course bespeak the generally conservative political attitudes harbored by the officer corps and the military

leadership. Of rank and file attitudes we know little, except to say that an Army of conscripts is probably a muted reflection of the trends and divisions of the society from which it is drawn. It has been openly and frequently acknowledged that the Army was "infected" or "penetrated" by the same divisions which overtook society, but to nowhere near the same extent. Such pressures within the Army are more easily contained. While the Party leadership passed through various stages of disarray, the Army leadership remained essentially unified. It would be a mistake, however, to construe this as evidence of monolithic unity. The overriding importance of the national issue which casts a shadow over the unity of Yugoslavia's political leadership extends to the military. The conflict of loyalties was evident in individual cases during the Croatian crisis, and more recent instances of Serb chauvinism among some general officers in Croatia (discussed in the chapter on the veterans) show that its potency remains. Had the application of force tested YPA cohesion either in the Croatian or (what is less likely) Serbian confrontations, division and disagreement might have surfaced within the military itself. Indeed, this prospect must have served as a powerful restraint on the use of the Army in any domestic dispute, something which would be no less a consideration in the future. There are, however, no indications that the Party leadership would not feel confident in using the Army to maintain or restore domestic order, or in its ability to cope with any dissension which might be provoked as a result. The question of reliability would depend on the nature of the crisis itself, and would be less likely to arise with regard to the top Army leadership than the general officer or regular officer corps.

Indeed, any projection of the political behavior of the YPA is incomplete without a reliable appraisal of political attitudes in the middle strata of the officer corps. Examples of military intervention in other countries abound in which the impetus originated at this level.* In Yugoslavia there is no evidence that major attitudinal differences exist which derive from relative positions

*It deserves to be noted here that while data on the politics and attitudes of senior officers are fragmentary, similar information concerning the middle-level officer corps is non-existent.

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in the military hierarchy. Yet because the officer cadre below general rank is so predominantly Serbian, its approach to any future crisis involving nationality disputes could prove to be a partisan one. Middle-level officers might take on an independent importance in other ways. Should they lack a sense of their own political inadequacy, that is of the political constraints felt by the top military leadership, they could be a source of pressure on that leadership for outright intervention in a politically unstable situation. This possibility renders all the more crucial the party's indoctrination and control functions within the YPA.

It is the general thesis of this paper that the Army's political role has evolved since 1971, perhaps ineluctably, within the general framework of strengthening central authority to the point where military support is essential to the preservation and extension of that authority. The political influence which has accrued to the military institution in this process is likely to continue, and in the post-Tito era, assuming the military's continued respect for civilian institutions and processes, its role within them is likely to be more pronounced. It is in this kind of setting where relatively conservative military attitudes might over time have a more direct and telling effect on policy. Available evidence suggests that the military would use its influence to press for and insure a domestic course which would be a somewhat exaggerated version of present political/organizational policies, and would remain committed to the fundamentals of Tito's self-management system. One clue provided by military behavior up to the present is the lower tolerance level concerning the persistence of elements and practices declared undesirable by the Party. Moreover, the military would be more inclined to view these deviations as less the product of individual excess or nonconformity than of the liberal institutions and practices which enable them to exist.

The military's foreign political attitudes could also be crucial in the post-Tito setting. There seems little reason to doubt the Army's ability to act with decision and unity should Yugoslavia face an attack or heavy diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union. Once again, little data are available but what observations or impressions exist support the conviction that the loyalties of the officer corps and the

military leadership remain firmly behind the principle of Yugoslav federation and the determination to defend it. In all probability, however, the situation will be less dramatic and more complex.

Would the Yugoslav military, whatever the measure of its influence, favor a more acquiescent posture toward the Soviet Union? No confident answer is possible based on existing reports. Military officials have periodically sought to reassure the United States that there has not been, nor will there be any YPA shift eastward.¹¹³ Sources have reported that opinion among most senior military officers was unfavorable to closer ties with the Soviets. In one specific case disagreement was reported among senior YPA officers and government officials over the nature of agreements made with the USSR on overflight and landing rights during the October 1973 Middle East war. (The agreements, according to this source, facilitated the movement of tanks and other materiel across Yugoslavia, and their shipment to the Middle East via Yugoslav ports.)¹¹⁴ In a less recent case, Defense Minister Ljubicic was reported to have favored granting a Soviet request for base and repair rights in the Bay of Kotor in 1972 in the face of intense opposition from at least one member of the State Presidency.¹¹⁵ If accurate, this open advocacy in the highest political councils of a more forthcoming attitude toward the USSR by the Defense Minister is significant indeed, and would almost certainly have to reflect like sentiments elsewhere in the military establishment. But other reports have indicated that no Soviet advisors or technicians have been on Yugoslav soil for years, presumably in part, because this has been opposed by the military, and further, that the strong anti-Soviet orientation which predominates in the military should assure that the Yugoslav government will continue to resist Soviet requests for Dalmatian port facilities.¹¹⁶ Elsewhere it was claimed that the Soviets were particularly unhappy with the mid-1973 dismissal of Tito's advisor on security affairs, General Ivan Miskovic, whose influence was seen as being favorable to a conservative, more Moscow-oriented course.¹¹⁷ In any case, the Soviets support the present conservative trend in the country and insofar as they identify the military as an intrinsic aspect of it, increased military influence must be cause for satisfaction.

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A spate of recent reports point to a number of high-level general officers who have maintained connections with the Soviets and who have been disciplined or dismissed as a direct result. While the reports are not entirely consistent, on the whole they provide the most persuasive evidence that some general officers do harbor pro-Soviet sympathies and that they have actively sought cooperation with the Soviets;* they provide the Soviets with at least a base of support within the YPA. The figure whose name has arisen most often in this connection is Lt. Gen. Mirko Bulovic (thought to be a Serb), in March 1974 the Director of the Command and Staff School in Belgrade. According to reports Bulovic was expelled from the Party along with General Otmar Kreacic (a Croat from Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose last-recorded military position was Under Secretary of National Defense in March 1965), and Col. Gen. Radojica Nenezic (a Serb from Slavonia, last recorded as Skopje Army District Commander in March 1967). Nenezic was dismissed for his evidently close political ties with Croatian centralist elements (see pages 21-22). The three generals were also reported to have opposed Defense Secretary Ljubicic in a controversy over the 1973 replacement of Miskovic, and in Ljubicic's policy of military appointments which permitted Tito's wife a major influence. Nenezic and Kreacic are apparently in an inactive, possibly retired, status.¹¹⁸

Inconsistencies aside, these reports challenge the putative unity of the higher echelons of the Yugoslav military. At the same time, the existence of pro-Soviet figures would appear to be a fringe phenomenon, albeit a persistent one. In August 1971, Tito was reported to be concerned over a group of some thirty generals, Nenezic among them, because of their Soviet connections.¹¹⁹ The very existence of such elements, while not comprising a meaningful faction might portend just that, should they be emboldened by Tito's departure. At a minimum, their existence points to the potential

*The term "pro-Soviet" is troubling because of its ambiguity, one which may permit unwarranted inferences. It is understood here to mean favoring a closer relationship with the USSR in the interests of enhancing Yugoslav security, and a critical approach to liberal aspects of Yugoslav life which tend, *inter alia*, foster both mistrust of the USSR and more forthcoming attitudes toward the West.

for deep splits between the highest military leadership and a portion of the general officer corps. In March 1974 during preparations for the all-important May LCY Congress the Party leadership reportedly ordered Ljubicic to take these three generals "out of circulation," presumably to preempt activities which sought to muster conservative support with a view to influencing the Congress. What resonance their pro-Soviet position elicited elsewhere within the officer corps is impossible to determine, but it is unlikely that they are entirely isolated individuals. There have been no observable reverberations, however. Nenezic's ties with Pero Car, the Croatian veterans' chief, and with what was openly branded a Croatian centralist faction, do suggest that the influence and activity of these pro-Soviet military leaders extends beyond the military. It reinforces earlier circumstantial evidence of close connections and common cause between the veterans and active military leaders.* And it points again to Slavonia in northeast Croatia as a convergence point for ultra-conservative military-political cooperation. Finally, the fact that both Serb and Croat generals have been mentioned suggests (as was the case in Croatia) that conservative proclivities within the military leadership do in fact transcend the national issue, and cannot be solely identified with Serbian chauvinism.

The incomplete and often contradictory data on the foreign policy attitudes of the military indicates, not surprisingly, that military opinion is divided over the limits and benefits of greater accommodation toward the USSR. Any number of scenarios might be anticipated in which the generally conservative attitudes of the military could redound to Soviet advantage. But the conservative attitudes which seem to prevail in the military, and have lead it with obvious enthusiasm to favor a more restrictive domestic course, are not sufficient reason to infer ready acceptance among the military leadership of a policy of collaboration with the USSR after Tito, especially one which would compromise the country's independence or eviscerate liberal aspects of the Yugoslav system odious to the USSR. On the other hand, it could be argued that in some future setting where a stricter do-

*It will be recalled from the discussion of veterans' activities in Croatia that links existed between veterans groups (and probably active-duty military officers) and centralist elements in the Croatian Party.

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mestic posture might be considered necessary to enhance the country's foreign policy capabilities, the military might be more amenable to changing or reinterpreting some domestic practices simply because they are less committed to them.*

A mainstay of Yugoslavia's policy of independence from the USSR is the doctrine of "non-alignment." The character of future Yugoslav-Soviet relations will therefore depend in important part on how the Yugoslav interpretation of "non-alignment" will be affected by the departure of the leader who now dominates foreign policy. It is uncertain, and perhaps unlikely, that Yugoslavia's complex posture on a variety of sensitive issues can be maintained in its present form. It is more doubtful still whether a Yugoslav leadership whose char-

*The analogy of Romania springs to mind. Yugoslav dissident author Mihajlo Mihajlov has suggested a possible future for the country which envisages more rigid, orthodox patterns of domestic control and organization combined with a continued policy of independence from the USSR, a scenario he has termed "Romanianization."

acter and policies were imposed by its military contingent, or a military leadership itself, would be able to maintain unchanged Yugoslavia's relations with its various non-aligned allies. Such a government might be less likely to elicit the genuine sympathy and support for the Yugoslav state from the West and the non-aligned world which has been basic thus far to maintaining the balance between East and West. (Although foregoing an activist non-alignment policy in some future setting need not imply a return to the Soviet fold.) Furthermore, one important factor in Yugoslavia's influence among the non-aligned nations has been the country's steadfastness in carrying forth its unique brand of socialism despite domestic challenge and foreign pressure. For the Yugoslav model to retain its appeal it must remain intact. Insofar as "non-alignment" assumes Yugoslav distance from the Soviet model, Belgrade's position would be compromised by a flirtation with or a withdrawal to centralized and bureaucratic methods which recalled earlier practices.

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2. Johnson, A. Ross, *The Yugoslav Doctrine of Total National Defense*, Rand Working Note WN-7398-ARPA, April 1971, pp. 23-27.
3. As quoted in Mladen Paver, "What Sort of Law on Defense?" *Svenarodna Obrana* (Zagreb), No. 1, 1971.
4. Johnson, *op. cit.*, *The Yugoslav Doctrine* . . . , pp. 4-5.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
6. Speech to the Conference of the Organization of the LC in the YPA, Belgrade, 22 March 1973.
7. A. Blagojevic, "Why a New Law on National Defense is Being Prepared," *Narodna Armija*, 25 January 1973.
8. Defense Minister Ljubicic recently described the YPA as "a framework of the entire system of All Peoples' Defense under all conditions of aggression," *Borba*, 6 November 1974.
9. [REDACTED] 11 April 1974, CONFIDENTIAL. Speech by CGS Potocar to officers of the Belgrade Garrison, *Narodna Armija*, 31 January 1974.
10. All of this from [REDACTED] 19 March 1974, transmittal of [REDACTED] 12 February 1974. (Except footnote No. 6 and Ljubicic statement)
11. The program was actually the upgrading of an extant but ineffective, unpopular, and dilatorily applied program.
12. This included formation of a separate "Organization of the Federation of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia in the YPA" in November 1974. The new organization will concentrate on the socialization of recruits: Comrade Tito has recently emphasized several times the great obligations and great opportunities of the military with respect to the education of the young people who pass through it. *Front*, 12 July 1974; *Tanjug Domestic*, 12 December 1974.
13. [REDACTED] 12 February 1974; *Tanjug Domestic*, 26 April 1974.
14. Belgrade Domestic Service, 15 February 1973, emphasis added.
15. "All Peoples' Defense is everybody's concern, and not just a concern of respective groups and individuals . . . the worker bears the greatest burden of all: he allocates funds for armaments and training and accepts and performs all the tasks . . . the working man is the basic and active factor of defense and . . . the Basic Organization of Associated Labor should be an organized interpreter and protagonist of preparations for the defense of the country. . . ." Belgrade Domestic Service, 15 February 1973.
16. According to the May 1974 National Defense Law, "The supreme direction and command of the armed forces insures the unity and indivisibility of the armed forces and of armed combat." Basic Principles, Section III; Article 105 stipulates that authority over the direction and command of the armed forces resides in the federation.

17. Resolution of the 17th session.
18. As quoted in RFE, 9 June 1971.
19. *Nin*, Belgrade, 20 June 1971, as reported in RFE, 28 June 1971.
20. An example: Lt. Gen. Srećko Manola, Commander in Chief of Croatia's Territorial Defense Units: It is necessary to achieve a relative internal stability. If within a society internal tensions go beyond a certain limit, it weakens the capability of the people to resist foreign threats. *Ibid*, RFE.
21. For example, YPA Chief of Staff Gen. Viktor Bubanj, issued warnings to some super intellectuals and quasi-writers who had been critical of the Yugoslav revolution. *Politika*, 5 July 1971.
22. *Vjesnik*, 28 April 1971.
23. *Op. Cit.*, RFE, 28 June 1971; [REDACTED] 6 January 1972. CONFIDENTIAL
24. *Nedeljne Novosti*, Belgrade, 13 June 1971.
25. See, e.g., [REDACTED] 22 June 1972. CONFIDENTIAL
26. Interview with *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 December 1972.
27. Speaking on Yugoslav Army Day, 21 December, in Sarajevo. Radio Zagreb, 22 December 1971; also *Borba*, 20 December 1971.
28. CF. The pointed statements of Lt. Col. Gen. Dzamil Sarac, Chairman of the Army Party Organization. *Tanjug*, 21 January 1972.
29. In this case by the Youth Association of Slovenia. *Delo*, 2 March 1972.
30. Dolanc claimed at a press conference that, contrary to some reports, the Army had played absolutely no part in resolving the crisis: Generals are included in our organizations, but they participated in everything as either members of our organization or observers. *Tanjug*, 11 January 1972.
31. CF. Col. Vasilije Cerovic (Military Commentary), "A Revolutionary Force," *Politika*, 16 January 1972.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Maj. Gen. Ivica Milicevic, "Why an Attack on the Army?" *Oslobođenje* (Weekly Supplement), Sarajevo, 5 February 1972. As noted earlier, the limited use of other Yugoslav languages is permitted. Cf. footnote, p. 12 Supra.
34. Lt. Col. Gen. Petar Pepeljegovski, "The Kind of Territorial Defense That We Need," *Obrana i Zastita*, November-December 1972.
35. 1969 figures. Zdenko Antic, "Political Influence of Yugoslavia's Veterans," RFE No. 1765, 10 April 1973. A more recent source puts the number of reserve officers in excess of 500,000. (Stane Dolanc, address to Federal Committee of the Federation of Reserve Officers and Noncommissioned Officers of Yugoslavia, 29 March 1974. *Tanjug Domestic*, 1 April 1974.)

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36. *Tanjug Domestic*, 16 April 1974.
37. Antic, *op. cit.*, "Political Influence . . ."; see also Radio Belgrade, 17 February 1973; *Borba*, 18 February 1973.
38. Nin, 19 September 1971, Bulat resigned from the LCC CC at the 27th Plenum under charges of Serbian chauvinism.
39. *Tanjug*, 7 January 1972.
40. *Tanjug*, 18 January 1972.
41. Frane Barbieri, editorial, "Offers and Applause," *Nin*, 6 February 1972.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Speech at Prijedor, 10 September 1972. New LCY status have specifically included the "veterans' organizations" as the coequal of the trade unions and SAWPY in the overall system of social self-management and governmental authority. (General Principles, para 2).
44. *Tanjug*, 4 July 1972.
45. At an October 1972 LCC CC plenum Planinc chided the veterans for placing themselves in front of the party in controlling rationalism, insisting at the same time that such deviations were uncharacteristic of the veterans as a whole.
46. *Vjesnik* interview, 8 October 1972.
47. Slobodan Stankovic, "Croatian Leaders Attack 'Centralist Faction'," RFE No. 1985, 7 February 1974.
48. "President of Croatian Parliament Attacks Centralistic Stalinist Forces," Zdenko Antic. RFE No. 1993, 12 February 1974. 25X1A2g
49. [REDACTED] 3 October 1974. SECRET/ 25X1A
50. Croatian Veterans' President Pero Car, in an address to the SUBNOR Presidium, Belgrade Domestic Service, 15 March 1973.
51. Belgrade Domestic Service, 23 March 1973.
52. *Kommunist*, Belgrade, 12 November 1973. Moreover, between the 9th and 10th LCY Congresses, that is between 1969 and 1974, 45,000 new members were admitted to the Army Party organization. Ljubicic's speech to the 10th LCY Congress, Belgrade Domestic Service, 27 May 1974.
53. Belgrade Domestic Service, 15 January 1973.
54. Report submitted to the Conference of the Organization of the League of Communists in the YPA, *Narodna Armija*, 29 March 1973. In the words of one directive, "The basic organizations of the League of Communists must exert more influence on ideological problems of training and education, human relations, internal order and discipline, the system of command and leadership, and cadre policy."
55. *Tanjug Domestic*, 18 November 1973; *Narodna Armija*, 18 April 1974.
56. *Op. Cit.*, *Narodna Armija*, 29 March 1973.
57. Dusan Vujatovic, chairman of the Commission for Ideological Questions of All Peoples' Defense, in a speech to the 5th session of the Conference of the LCY Organization in the YPA, *Tanjug*, 15 November 1972.
58. Speaking to the first session of the newly elected Conference of the Organization of the League of Communists in the YPA, *Tanjug Domestic*, 22 March 1973.
59. *Tanjug Domestic*, 18 November 1973.
60. *Op. Cit.*, "Report . . ." *Narodna Armija*.
61. *Tanjug Domestic*, 16 February 1973.
62. *Tanjug*, 9 February 1973.
63. Miodrag Cvetkovic, "Some Causes of the Weak Response for Work in the Internal Affairs Service in Croatia," 13 *Maj*, September 1973.
64. *Narodna Armija*, according to *Tanjug*, 24 April 1974, commended Slovenian efforts as exemplary and called for more vigorous efforts in other republics.
65. *Mladina*, 11 December 1973.
66. According to the Secretariat of the Committee of the LC in the YPA, *Tanjug Domestic*, 19 November 1973.
67. At the LCY Army Conference session, *Tanjug*, 24 June 1974.
68. As Defense Minister Ljubicic phrased it in an October 1972 speech. *Borba*, 6 October 1972.
69. *Tanjug Domestic*, 15 December 1972.
70. "Passport and Defense," *Narodna Armija*, February 8, 1973. See also *Odbrana i Zastita*, July-August 1973.
71. See *Borba*, 6 January 1973, and the Law on Service in the Yugoslav Armed Forces, *Sluzbeni List SFRJ*, No. 22, 4 May 1974.
72. *Borba*, 27 January 1974, 1 February 1974.
73. "Both Sides of the Enemies of Our Country," *Front*, 16 and 23 March 1973.
74. This and the other Miskovic quotes that follow are from lengthy interviews in *Vjesnik u Srijedu* (Zagreb) 5, 12, 19 April 1972.
75. *Ibid.* 25X1A2g
76. [REDACTED] 17 July 1973, [REDACTED] 25X1A
77. *Ibid.* 25X1A2g
78. *Borba*, 13 June 1973.
79. This account is based on [REDACTED] 19 January 1973, SECRET.
80. [REDACTED] 2917, June 1973, CONFIDENTIAL. 25X1A2g
81. [REDACTED] SECRET/NFD/CD. 25X1A2g
82. Cf. USDAO Forwarding of a [REDACTED] 27 June 1973; [REDACTED] 25X1A2g
- June 1973, CONFIDENTIAL. 25X1A2g
83. No. 6, June 1973.
84. *Tanjug Domestic*, 17 May 1974.
85. *Tanjug*, 13 January 1974.
86. [REDACTED] pp. 11, 12, SECRET/ 25X1A2g 25X1A
87. *Ibid.*

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25X1A 88. [REDACTED] 1 October 1974, SECRET/
25X1A2g 89. Based on [REDACTED] 25X1A2g
25X1A2g [REDACTED] 1 March 1974 [REDACTED]
5X1A2g [REDACTED] cember 1972, CONFIDENTIAL. Hereinafter cited as [REDACTED] 25X1A 25X1A2g
25X1A2g 90. [REDACTED] SECRET [REDACTED]
91. [REDACTED] 5 September 1974, SEC
[REDACTED] 25X1A
92. *Ibid.*
25X1A2g 93. [REDACTED] CONFIDENTIAL.
94. *Ibid.*
95. Joza Vlahovic, "Colonels as Watchmen," *Vjesnik u Srijedu*, 13 October 1971.
25X1A2g 96. [REDACTED] 21 October 1974. SEC-
25X1A [REDACTED]
25X1A2g 97. Cf. [REDACTED] 6 June 1974. CON-
FIDENTIAL. 25X1A
98. Cf. *Tanjug*, 13 January 1974.
99. *Delo*, 8 March 1974.
100. Interview with Dr. Janez Pecar, Director of the Institute of Criminology at the Law Facility in Ljubljana, *Ilustrirani Tedni Delo*, 19 March 1974.
101. *Ibid.*
25X1A2g 102. [REDACTED] SECRET/NFD.
103. Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslav Army Influence to be Strengthened," RFE #2057, 25 April 1974; *Borba*, 7 April 1974.
104. Col. Vasilije Cerovic (Military Commentary), "The Strengthening of Defense," *Politika*, 22 October 1972.
105. Col. Vasilije Cerovic (Military Commentary), "The Class and the Army," *Politika*, 11 February 1973.
106. *Ibid.*
107. Branko Kovacevic, "Military Affairs are the Affairs of the Society," *Vjesnik*, 14 March 1971.

108. Lt. Gen. Stjepan Domankusic, Chief of Army Counterintelligence (KOS), "The Broad Basis of Security," *Narodna Armija*, 10 May 1973.

109. *Socijalizam*, No. 1, 1973, pp. 41-53.

110. Unsigned editorial, "We are at the Present Military-Political Moment: Strong Defense, Greater Security," *Narodna Armija*, 1 November 1973.

111. *Narodna Armija*, 20 December 1973.

112. Lt. Col. Gen. Dzermal Sara., Secretary of the Army Party organization, in an interview with *Kommunist*, as reported by *Tanjug Domestic*, 15 December 1973. Published in the 17 December 1973 issue.

113. E.g., [REDACTED] 25X1A2g
CONFIDENTIAL.

114. [REDACTED] 28 February 1974 25X1A2g
CONFIDENTIAL.

115. [REDACTED] 23 May 1973. SECRET 25X1A2g
[REDACTED] 25X1A2g

116. [REDACTED] 23 August 1972. SECRET/
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117. [REDACTED] July 1973, CONFIDENTIAL. 25X1A2g
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118. [REDACTED]

119. [REDACTED] 3 August 1971, S/NFD/
[REDACTED] 25X1A2g

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GLOSSARY

- YPA Yugoslav Peoples' Army.
- LCY League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
- LCC League of Communists of Croatia, one of eight subordinate regional parties in the Yugoslav federal system based upon republics (6) or autonomous provinces. (2)
- Opstina Approximately 500 *opstina* or communes comprise the tertiary level (below the federation and the republics) of Yugoslav governmental-administrative organization.
- SAWPY The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, the Party's national front organization, under whose umbrella such mass organization as the trade unions are grouped.
- All Peoples' Defense (APD) .. Also described as Territorial Defense and Total National Defense, the Yugoslav concept of national defense was devised in 1969. It is modeled in part on the guerrilla tactics and mass mobilization of the 1941-1945 partisan war, and has as its organizational base the separate republics and autonomous provinces.
- SUBNOR Union of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia (*Savez Udruzenja Boraca Narodnooslobodilackog rata*).